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The purpose ofthis descriptive case study analysis was to provide portraits of  the 
heuristics students used and difficulties they encountered solving conditional probability 
problems prior to and after two-week instruction on sample space, probability, and 
conditional probability.  Further analysis consisted of  evaluating the data in relation to a 
previously designed Conditional Probability Framework for assessing students levels of 
thinking developed by Tarr and Jones (1997).  Five volunteer participants from a 
contemporary college mathematics course participated in pre- and post-interviews ofa 
Probability Knowledge Inventory.  The Inventory consisted of  seven tasks on sample 
space, probability, and conditional probability.  The semi-structured interviews provided 
participants' explanations on the development oftheir solutions to the seven tasks. 
Among the five participants, rationalizing, finding the odds, computing the 
percentages, and stating the ratio ofa problem were the preferred heuristics used to solve 
the problems on the Probability Knowledge Inventory.  After the two-week instruction, 
two of  the four participants who did not previously use computation ofprobability to 
Redacted for privacysolve the problem changed their use ofheuristics.  The difficulties the students 
encountered prior to instruction included understanding the problem; recognizing the 
original sample space and when it changes; lacking probability vocabulary knowledge; 
comparing probability after the sample space changed; understanding the difference 
between probability and odds; and interchanging ratio, odds, and percentages ­
sometimes incorrectly - to justify their solution.  After the two-week instruction, the 
students'  difficulties diminished.  Some improvements included a greater ability to 
understand the question ofinterest, to recognize the change in the sample space after a 
conditioning event, to use probability terminology consistently, and to compare 
probability after the sample space has changed. 
Comparisons to the Probability Framework revealed that four ofthe five 
participants exemplified Level 3 thinking - being aware ofthe role that quantities play in 
forming conditional probability judgements.  One participant exemplified a Level 4 
thinking - being aware ofthe composition ofthe sample space, recognizing its 
importance in determining conditional probability and assigning numerical probabilities 
spontaneously and with explanation. The Heuristics College Students Use and the Difficulties they Encounter 
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The Need for Understanding Probability 

Introduction 
Random events play increasingly common roles in our daily lives.  From 
shuffling cards for a game ofcribbage, to selecting an appropriate retirement fund, to 
relying on a new treatment for cancer, most people encounter chance daily.  Random 
events are a part ofthe natural world.  They can be found in random noise, arrangements 
ofthe petals ofa flower, and the rolling ofa fair die.  Fortunately, some "random events" 
do obey laws of  some kind.  If  we knew these laws, it would simplify some of  our lives. 
The use ofchance mechanisms and the recognition ofrandom events dates back 
to ancient Egypt, prior to 3500 BC.  Archeological digs have uncovered board games 
from 3500 BC, perfectly balanced fired-pottery die from 3000 BC, and evidence of 
Egyptians playing the game odd-or-even in 2000 Be (Lightner, 1991; Bennett, 1998; 
Borovcnik, Bentz, & Kapadia, 1991).  Random events also played a vital role for ancient 
people in their daily lives: settling disputes among neighbors, selecting a course of 
military strategy, dividing property, and delegating civic responsibilities or privileges 
(Bennett, 1998).  Despite the everyday presence of  chance and random events, the 
development ofthe laws regarding chance and certain random events is quite young. 
This lack ofearly knowledge ofpattern recognition in rolling dice or playing cards has 2 
puzzled present day mathematical historians and philosophers.  Some theories have been 
developed in an attempt to explain the lack of  recognition ofthe mathematics behind 
random events.  Among the many theories, two theories appear to be the most acceptable. 
First, it was possible that the cultures and beliefs ofthe past may have had an influence 
on the inability to recognize this link.  Evidence ofa belief that God or gods directed 
earthly events in a predetermined plan, in which randomness was not considered, is 
demonstrated in the early use oflotteries and dice for consulting gods (Lightner, 1991; 
Hacking, 1975).  A second theory asserts a lack ofappropriate mathematical notations, 
symbols, and numerate people, which was evident by the origin ofthe pips (or dots) on 
dice.  Earlier people recognized the relationships of  greater than and less than, but did not 
know the concept ofnumbers and numeracy.  It was not until the Renaissance Period 
(14th - 17th centuries) and the development of  algebra that the ability to write and 
calculate with Hindu-Arabic numerals was developed by scholars (Lightner, 1991).  Once 
mathematical notations and symbols were invented, and the church was more open to 
scientific inquiry, mathematicians started to recognize number sense, number patterns, 
and empirical frequencies associated with certain random events.  By the late 15th 
century a true mathematical treatment ofrandom events, and the study ofchance 
eventually turned into the branch of  mathematics called probability. 
Although probability had its origins in the games of  chance, probability has 
become a branch of  mathematics with wide ramifications in scientific research, business 
and industry, politics, and practical daily activity.  As these examples illustrate, 
probability permeates day-to-day life: 3 
• 	 There is a 20% chance ofrain tomorrow. 
• 	 A screening test for a certain virus is 95% accurate for both infected 
and uninfected persons. 
• 	 The new reading program implemented in the local school system 
increased the students' reading scores (p < .05). 
In recent years, organizations have recognized the need for teaching probability. 
The National Council of  Teachers of  Mathematics (1989), in its publication of 
Curriculum and Evaluation Standards, called for introducing a number ofprobability 
concepts throughout the K-12 school curricula.  The National Council of  Teachers of 
Mathematics (2000) continues its support of  teaching probability concepts in its most 
recent publication ofPrinciples and Standards for School Mathematics.  Similarly, at the 
post-secondary level, the American Mathematical Association ofTwo-Year Colleges 
(1995), in its publication of  Crossroads in Mathematics: Standards for Introductory 
College Mathematics Before Calculus, also recognizes the need to introduce non-
mathematics and science major students to the basic probability laws.  Finally, the 
American Association for the Advancement of  Science (1993), in its publication of 
Benchmarksfor Science Literacy, discusses the need for probability in the K-12 
curriculum to enhance students' understanding of  real-world events.  These proposals call 
for an increased emphasis on probability in the mathematics and science curriculum. 
Since the emphasis of  introducing and expanding on the concept of  probability in 
the mathematics and science curriculum is quite recent in the U. S. curriculum, there has 
been little impetus to carry out research regarding the effects teaching has on student 
understanding of  probability.  In fact, most of  the contributions on probability research 
have concentrated on student misconceptions and intuitions ofprobability.  However, 
these studies conducted by cognitive psychologists mainly focused on the misconceptions 4 
and intuitions people have, not on how the influence ofinstruction may change student 
thinking (Cohen, 1957, 1960; Falk, 1986, 1988, 1989b; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 
1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1982).  The majority ofthe studies 
focusing on the effects teaching has on student understanding ofprobability derive from 
research on non-North American mathematics and statistics researchers, thus, looking at 
a different curriculum (Castro, 1998; Fischbein & Gazit, 1984; Fischbein & Schnarch, 
1998).  By combining the efforts ofthe cognitive psychologists and the mathematics and 
statistics educators, the proposals ofvarious mathematics and science organizations can 
become an effective tool in educating the population on the concept ofprobability. 
Statement ofthe Problem 
Most mathematics educators and many teachers have accepted the increased 
attention given to probability and statistics in national curriculum reform statements. 
This emphasis on broader explorations ofprobability concepts in the curriculum has 
established a need for further research into the probabilistic thinking of  students of  all 
ages. Although there has been substantial research on students' probabilistic thinking 
(Cohen, 1957, 1960; Falk, 1986, 1988, 1989b; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1982), little ofthat research has focused on 
student's probabilistic thinking in the classroom (Fischbein &  Schnarch, 1997; Pollatsek, 
Well, Konold, Hardiman, & Cobb, 1987), and even fewer studies focus on the teaching 
and learning ofprobability at the collegiate level (Austin, 1974; Shaughnessy, 1977). 
More research is needed on the teaching and learning ofprobability. 5 
The teaching and learning ofprobability is a complex process; therefore, 
conducting research on the teaching and learning of probability is a multi-faceted 
enterprise.  By focusing on one concept in the probability classroom and trying to 
understand how teaching affects the learning of  a particular concept, the researcher can 
solve the puzzle piece by piece.  The intent of  this study is to look at the teaching and 
learning of  conditional probability in a college level math course.  In particular, the 
questions of  interest for this study were: 
1. 	 What are some ofthe heuristics college students use, and what are some ofthe 
difficulties they encounter solving conditional probability problems prior to 
receiving instruction on sample space, probability of  an event, and conditional 
probability? 
2. 	 After attending a two-week class on sample space, probability of  an event, and 
conditional probability, in what ways did the students' heuristics change, and in 
what ways were they able to overcome difficulties they had previously 
encountered when solving conditional probability problems? 
3. 	 How does each student's understanding ofconditional probability compare to the 
Conditional Probability Framework developed by Tarr and Jones (1997)? 6 
Chapter II 

Review ofthe Literature 

Introduction 
The purpose ofthis study is to explore the interrelationships between the teaching 
and learning of  conditional probability at the post-secondary level.  Four bodies of 
research inform this investigation and provide the foundation for the theoretical 
framework: research on 
•  probabilistic heuristics, 
•  conditional probability heuristics and difficulties, 
•  teaching and learning ofprobability, and 
•  framework for student probabilistic thinking in instruction. 
Within these four bodies of  research, this review will include more elaborate 
investigations on the specific studies pertaining to the teaching and learning of 
conditional probability at the collegiate level. 
Research on Probabilistic Heuristics 
Suppose one is faced with determining the outcome of  an election, the guilt of  a 
defendant, or the chance ofwinning at the roulette table.  Ifthis person has no exposure 
to knowledge ofchance, or the statistical theory of  prediction, they will try to reduce the 
complex tasks ofassessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations.  The reduction ofcomplex tasks of  assessing probabilities and predicting 7 
values to simpler judgmental operations has been defined in research on the 
understanding ofprobability as probabilistic heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
These heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable judgements, can also lead to severe 
and systematic errors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Defining a naIve subject as a person who has not had a formal class in probability, a 
series of  studies with both naive and educated subjects has supported this hypothesis. 
This section gives an overview of  four ofthe probabilistic heuristics researchers found 
that are used to assess the likelihood of  an event: 
•  Representativeness 
•  Availability 
•  Positive and Negative Recency Effects (Gambler's Fallacy) 
•  Conjunction Fallacy 
Representativeness 
One heuristic Kahneman and Tversky (1972) associate with subjective probability 
is representativeness.  A person who follows this heuristic estimates that the probability 
ofan uncertain event is based on how well an outcome represents some aspect ofits 
parent population, or how the event reflects the prominent features ofthe process by 
which it is generated.  Tversky and Kahneman (1982) pursued their interest in 
representativeness to define six subcategories: insensitivity to prior probability of 
outcomes, insensitively to sample space, misconceptions ofchance, insensitivity to 
predictability, illusion ofvalidity, and misconceptions ofregression. For example, the 
representativeness ofmisconceptions of  chance state that people expect that a sequence 8 
of  events generated by a random process will represent the essential characteristics ofthat 
process even when the sequence is short.  People believing that the sequence offlipping a 
coin five times and obtaining H-T-H-T-H is more likely than H-H-H-T-T, or even the 
sequence H-H-H-T-H, easily illustrate misconception ofchance. 
Availability 
Availability is another heuristic associated with subjective probability.  Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973) described a person who uses availability as one who evaluates the 
probability of  an event by the ease with which relevant instances come to mind. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1982) continued their interest in availability to find three subcategories: 
bias due to retrievability ofinstances, bias ofimaginability, and illusory correlation.  For 
example, suppose a word is randomly picked from an English Dictionary.  Is it more 
likely that the word begins with the letter K, or that K is its third letter?  Availability tells 
the naIve person, one who has not had formal education in probability, that since it is 
much easier to think of  words starting with K than of  words in which K is the third letter, 
they would believe the word is more likely to start with K.  Unfortunately, in the English 
language, there are about twice as many words with K in the third position than in the 
first (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Positive and Negative Recency Effects (Gambler'S Fallacy) 
Some researchers of  probabilistic heuristics classify positive and negative recency 
effects as subcategories of  representativeness. However, the research conducted on 9 
recency effects took place before the recognition ofthe representativeness heuristic 
(Cohen, 1957, 1960).  Recency occurs when a person is uncertain how to calculate the 
outcome ofthe next event, given the results ofthe previous independent trials. For 
example, a person using the positive recency heuristic when predicting a head or tail on a 
flip ofa coin tends to believe that after a run ofheads, a head is more likely to occur in 
the next toss.  Thus, the positive recency effect causes the person to assume incorrectly 
that the conditions were not fair.  A person using a negative recency heuristic when 
predicting a head or tail on a flip of  a coin tends to believe that after a run ofheads, a tail 
is more likely to occur in the next toss.  Thus, the negative recency effect causes the 
person to believe intuitively that the alternating outcomes seem to better represent a 
random sequence.  The idea ofnegative recency effect has also been known as 
"Gambler's Fallacy", in which the gambler believes the events will balance at the end. 
Conjunction Fallacy 
The conjunction fallacy stems from the extension rule ofthe Law ofProbability: 
IfA  ::) B, then peA)  ~ PCB).  Since the set ofpossibilities associated with the 
conjunction (A and B) is included in the set ofpossibilities associated with B, the same 
principle can also be expressed by the conjunction rule: P (A and B)  ~ PCB).  However, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found in their study that when a person is given an 
uncertain event involving conjunctions, people tend to use the representativeness and 
availability heuristics to make a conjunction appear more probable.  One oftheir studies 
showed that 85-90% oftheir subjects violated the conjunction rule ofprobability.  This 
was illustrated when after people were given a description ofa fictitious female character, 10 
who is "bright, single, 31  years old, outspoken, and concerned with issues of  social 
justice", the subjects were more likely to believe that the person was a bank teller and 
was active in the feminist movement, than that the person was just a bank teller. 
Conclusion 
By investigating these primitive conceptions, intuitions ofprobability, 
misconceptions, fallacies in thinking, and jUdgmental biases, researchers have been able 
to construct a framework ofhow and when people use these heuristics.  Based on these 
descriptive results ofheuristics, teachers can become familiar with student's preexisting 
probabilistic conceptions before they try to teach the mathematical concepts of 
probability.  A few ofthe following studies reviewed in this chapter use some ofthe 
findings ofthese psychologists when conducting research on the teaching and learning of 
conditional probability. 
Research on Conditional Probability Heuristics and Difficulties 
The probability ofan event will vary depending upon the occurrences or 
nonoccurrence ofone or more related events.  For example, Oregon sport fishermen are 
vitally interested in the probability of  rain.  The probability ofrain on a given day, 
ignoring the daily atmospheric conditions or any other events, is the fraction ofdays in 
which rain occurs over a long period oftime.  This would be called "unconditional 
probability".  Consider the chance of  it raining tomorrow.  It has rained almost 
continuously for two days and a storm is heading up the coast.  This probability is 11 
conditional on the occurrence ofseveral events, and Oregonian would tell you that it is 
much larger than the unconditional probability ofrain.  Thus, the "conditional 
probability" ofan event is the probability ofthe event given the fact that one or more 
events have already occurred.  Problem I, II and III illustrate other conditional probability 
problems found in textbooks, life experiences, and professional decisions: 
Problem I (Falk 1988, p. 292): 
An urn contains two white balls and two black balls.  We blindly draw 
two balls, one after the other without replacement from that urn. 
a. 	 What is the probability that the second ball was white, given 
the first was also white? 
b. 	 What is the probability that the first ball was white, given that 
the second ball was also white? 
Problem II (Tversky & Kahneman, 1980, p. 51): 
Which ofthe following is more probable: 
a. 	 That a girl has blue eyes ifher mother has blue eyes 
b. 	 That the mother has blue eyes, ifher daughter has blue eyes 
c. 	 The two events are equally probable 
Problem III (Falk, 1986): 
Which statement is the definition ofa Type I error, a, in hypothesis 
testing: 
a. 	 The probability that one will reject the null hypothesis, given that 
the null hypothesis is true. 
b. 	 The probability ofthe null hypothesis is true, given that we 
rejected the null hypothesis 
However, taking into consideration people's experiences with conditional probability, 
researchers identified common heuristics and difficulties people have in solving these 
types ofproblems.  Time-axis (Falk, 1983, 1988) and causal bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1980) are two conditional heuristics used by people who are unsure how to solve the 
complex tasks of  assessing conditional probabilities.  Calculating the inverse ofthe 12 
condition, identifying the conditional event, and confusion due to the wording or framing 
ofthe conditional probability are three difficulties people encounter when trying to solve 
a conditional statement (Falk, 1989a). 
Time-Axis Fallacy Heuristic (Falk Phenomenon) 
The time-axis fallacy is the most prominent heuristic ofconditional probability. 
Falk (1983, 1988) recognized that when a person is given a conditional probability 
situation, and asked about the probability ofthe first event happening, given the second 
has occurred, they have a difficult time going "back in time" to comprehend the question 
correctly. This heuristic is illustrated in Problem I, from above.  Falk (1983, 1989b) 
found that the subjects ofher study were able to answer part (a) correctly - one third ­
however, some subjects did not believe part (b) had an answer.  The subjects argued that 
the probability ofan outcome ofa draw on an event that occurs later is not permissible. 
Others argued that since the first ball does not care whether the second is black or white, 
the answer will be one half. Hence, those who use the time-axis heuristic want to 
compute the probability ofan event occurring at the immediate point of  time at which the 
event takes place. 
Causal Bias Heuristic 
A causal scheme follows a course of  cause to consequence.  However, 
when people are faced with finding the probability ofan uncertain causal event, they may 
find it easier to invert this sequence and reason from consequence to cause.  Research 13 
conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1980) tested this hypothesis by asking people 
which is more probable: P(xIY) or P(YIX) when X is the natural cause of  Y and P(X) = 
P(Y).  In this study, the majority ofthe subjects answered P(YIX) > P(XIY). An example 
used in their study was Problem II, from above.  Since the distribution of  eye color is 
essentially the same in successive generations, more subjects regarded answer (a), the 
causal answer, as the correct answer, over (b), the diagnostic answer. 
Difficulties with Calculating Conditional Probability 
It is possible that a person is proficient in the computing ofconditional 
probability.  Due to confusion between a conditional and its inverse, difficulties 
identifying the conditional event, and uncertainty ofthe question ofinterest due to the 
wording or framing, they may have approached the problem incorrectly (Falk, 1989a). 
Problem III, from above, is an example ofconfusion between a conditional and its 
inverse.  The probability that one will reject the null hypothesis, given that the null 
hypothesis is true is the definition of  a Type I error.  However, due to some linguistic 
ambiguities, a person familiar with hypothesis testing may have a tendency to interpret 
the inverse as the definition (Falk, 1986, 1989a). 
Conditional Probability Heuristics and Difficulties in College Students 
College instructors generally agree that people have a great deal of  difficulty with 
conditional probability.  Through two experiments, Pollatsek, et al. (1987) tried to 
examine three areas concerning the heuristics and difficulties college students have in 14 
their study ofcollege students' understanding ofconditional probabilities.  Defining 
"naIve student" as an undergraduate who has not taken a college level statistics course, 
Pollatsek, et al. (1987) first investigated naIve students ofconditional probability.  They 
wanted to explore the possibility that naIve students have a fundamental inability to deal 
with conditional probabilities.  Their second interest consisted ofthe misconception of 
the notation P(BIA). Pollatsek, et al. (1987) wanted to determine ifthe problem laid in the 
confusion ofthe conceptual understanding between P(BIA) and peA and B).  Their third 
issue concerned casual bias. Tversky and Kahneman (1980) have argued that a causal 
bias exists in judging conditional probabilities.  Pollatsek, et al. (1987) wanted to test if 
this causal bias is truly powerful and persuasive as claimed. 
The first experiment explored naIve students' fundamental inability to deal with 
conditional probability and the effect of  causal bias. On the first day ofclass, the 86 
undergraduate students enrolled in a lower division psychology course completed a six­
question, forced answered questionnaire.  Each question consisted ofan event in which 
the students were asked which ofthe following three options stated the correct 
relationship between P(AIB) and P(BIA):  P(AIB) < P(BIA), P(AIB) > P(BIA), or P(AIB) = 
P(BIA).  Ofthe six questions, three questions were events chosen to contradict the idea of 
causality.  These three questions consisted ofscenarios in which Event A could be 
thought as necessary but not an adequate cause ofEvent B, and Event A is strongly 
implied by Event B; however, the two events are related.  For example, ifEvent A was 
"being sick" and Event B was "having a fever", Event A both causes and is implied by 
Event B; however, P(AIB) > P(BIA). The remaining three questions were chosen to be 
sensitive to any causal bias that might have existed.  The first question considered a 15 
scenario in which Event A does not cause Event B, and the two events are not related. 
The last two questions did not have correct answers for the information given.  Thus, 
students were forced to pick a relationship based on their bias. 
The unit ofanalysis consisted ofthe percentage ofcorrect responses to each of  the 
questions from the entire population.  The data analysis consisted ofvisually comparing 
the percentages, without statistical support.  The results ofthe study indicate that most of 
the subjects (72% - 87%) gave the correct answer to the three problems testing causality. 
In all three cases, the students strongly preferred the alternative consistent with P(AIB) > 
P (BIA).  The three questions referring to the sensitivity ofany causal bias, indicate the 
students had a tendency to choose the alternative consistent with P (effectlcause) > 
P(  causeleffect).  This result indicates the students were not sensitive to causal bias.  Also, 
50% ofthe students were able to choose P(AIB) =  P (BIA), as the correct answer being 
sought. Hence, the results from the first experiment illustrate that naIve students do have 
a fundamental ability to deal with conditional probabilities; however, certain factors did 
interfere with their judgement: wording ofthe problem and unfamiliarity with the context 
ofthe problem. 
A second experiment explored the misconception ofthe notation P(BIA) and 
possible hindrances naIve students may have calculating these probabilities.  The two 
main hindrances explored in this experiment were the possibility of  the wording ofthe 
problem affecting student's judgement and the confusion between conjunction and 
conditional probability.  For this experiment, 120 students were recruited from various 
sections ofan introductory psychology course designed for psychology majors and 16 
received course credit for participation.  These students were also considered naIve in 
probability since they did not take a college level probability course. 
The data collected for the second experiment consisted ofthe results from two 
different questionnaires.  The first questionnaire consisted of  seven forced-choice 
questions judging whether P(AIB) was greater, less than, or equal to P(BIA).  The first 
questionnaire was presented to the student in two different formats, but with the same 
seven events.  Half  the students answered questions posed in a probability format, while 
the other half answered questions posed in a percentage format.  The distinction between 
questions posed in the probability and percentage questions was used to see ifthe 
wording caused the difficulty in student understanding ofthe problem.  The second 
questionnaire consisted ofthe same seven questions; however, the students were asked to 
estimate the conditional probability in percentages, with justifications oftheir answers. 
Students were given fixed amounts oftime to complete each section ofthe questionnaire, 
to discourage the students from answering hastily.  The estimation questions were used to 
judge the students' confusion between conjunction and conditional probability questions. 
The study does not discuss the validity or reliability of either questionnaire. 
The unit ofanalysis consisted ofthe percentage ofcorrect responses to each ofthe 
seven questions from each ofthe two groups.  The data analysis consisted of  visually 
comparing the percentages, without statistical support.  The results from the forced­
choice questionnaire indicated that the performance ofjUdging conditional probability 
varied widely across the problems - from 30% to 80% correct.  When comparing the 
probability form ofthe test against the percentage form, student performance was similar, 
with an average of57.0% and 56.7% correct respectively.  These results indicate that 17 
there was no difference between student responses with respect to the wording of  the 
questions. 
The results from the estimation questionnaire indicated there was almost an 80% 
agreement between the forced choice responses and the estimation responses, with 
slightly better performance on the estimation section.  Finally, the estimation data were 
analyzed for their "reasonableness".  For this study, reasonableness was defined as 
answers that met certain criteria for each ofthe seven questions.  The patterns found 
within the estimations ofreasonableness suggest that some subjects may have confused 
conditional and joint probabilities. 
Fischbein and Schnarch (1997) investigated the evolution, with age ofthe student, 
on probabilistic intuitions and misconceptions, in which, one ofthe misconceptions 
considered is conditional probability.  Intuition, as defined in this study, is "a cognition 
that appears subjectively as self-evident, directly acceptable, holistic, coercive, and 
extrapolative" (p. 96).  Intuitive cognition is differentiated from an analytically and 
logically based cognition by intuitive cognition producing a feeling ofobviousness and of 
intrinsic certainty when the student solves a problem. 
The sample for the study consisted offive groups ofIsraeli students without 
previous instruction on probability: 20 fifth grade students, 20 seventh grade students, 20 
ninth grade students, 20 eleventh grade students, and 19 college students. The students 
were administered a questionnaire with seven probability misconceptions identified in 
past papers on probability heuristics: representativeness, negative and positive recency 
effects, simple and compound events, conjunction fallacy, effects of  sample six, 
availability and the time-axis fallacy.  Each question consisted ofa description ofan 18 
event with three forced-choice possible answers: the correct response, the common 
incorrect misconception response, and a distracter.  The questionnaire was administered 
to the students during a regularly scheduled class, allowing them one hour to complete 
the questionnaire. 
The unit ofanalysis consisted ofthe average score of  all five groups on each 
question.  An average score for each question was compiled by computing the percentage 
of  students in each group who answered one ofthe three responses.  The analysis ofthe 
results consisted ofcomparing the average percentages for each misconception reply 
across all age levels.  By comparing the average percentages of  students answering the 
questions with the main misconception, the study indicates that the misconceptions of 
representativeness (from 75% to 22%), negative recency effect (from 35% to 0%), and 
the conjunction fallacy (from 85% to 44%) decrease with age.  The results also show that 
availability (from 10% to 72%) and the effect ofthe time-axis (from 5% to 44%) 
increased with age; and positive recency effects (from 0% to 6%), and compound and 
simple events (from 70% to 78%) remained stable with age. However, the question 
pertaining to the misconception ofthe effect ofsample space remained a strong 
misconception, with only one student from the entire sample answering the question 
correctly. 
A closer look at the effect ofthe time-axis indicates the lack ofunderstanding of 
conditional probability.  As indicated earlier, the misconception of  the time-axis 
increased with the age ofthe student (from 5% to 44%).  The initial question on the 
questionnaire consisted oftwo parts (p. 99): 19 
Y  oav and Galit each receive a box containing two white marbles and two 
black marbles. 
a. 	 Y  oav extracts a marble from his box and finds out that it is a 
white one.  Without replacing the first marble, he extracts a 
second marble.  Is the likelihood that this second marble is also 
white smaller than, equal to, or greater than the likelihood that it 
is a black marble? 
b. 	 Galit extracts a marble from her box and puts it aside without 
looking at it.  She then extracts a second marble and sees that it is 
white.  Is the likelihood that the first marble she extracted is 
smaller than, equal to, or greater than the likelihood that it is 
black? 
The responses to this question were divided into three categories.  In Category I, both 
responses were correct; in Category II, the first response was correct and the second 
incorrect; in Category III, both responses are incorrect.  The category of  interest is 
Category II, since this category illustrates that the student understands probability; 
however, the student had the main misconception oftime-axis.  The apparently causal 
order ofthe story, as it is told in a sequence ofevents, hides the genuine probabilistic 
structure of  the problem: the two questions actually express the same problem.  Due to 
the method ofcollection ofthe data and the nature ofthe analysis, it is unclear as to why 
the misconception oftime-axis increased with age. 
The results from this study suggest there is an instability ofprobabilistic intuitions 
as the student ages.  The researchers hoped to justify that the intuitions tend to stabilize 
and become resistant to the influence ofage and instruction.  However, this study 
indicates that some misconceptions diminish with age, one was stable, and some gained 
greater influence.  The results from this study had impressed the researchers.  The 
question of  interest was to see ifthe probabilistic misconceptions - combined - increased 20 
or decreased with age.  They did not expect the results to be scattered among the various 
misconceptions. 
The results from the two previous studies on the conditional probability heuristics 
and difficulties in College Students found two main observations: conditional probability 
intuition decreases with age (Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997), and the major source of  error 
in computing conditional probability was the confusion between conditional and joint 
probabilities (Pollatsek, et aI., 1987).  However, as indicated by Pollatsek, et ai. (1987), 
college students misunderstanding ofthe problem was not due to the word choice of 
probability or percentage, and college students were not influenced by causal bias. These 
results may indicate that college students do have a fundamental ability to deal with 
conditional probability. 
Research on the Teaching and Learning ofProbability 
The previous two sections looked at the studies investigating the heuristics people 
might use, and the difficulties they might encounter when trying to solve probability and 
conditional probability problems.  This section investigates the studies that look at the 
effects ofinstruction on students at all levels and how the intervention may influence 
their use ofheuristics and difficulties when solving probability and conditional 
probability problems. 21 
Collegiate Teaching Programs 
Austin (1974) conducted an experimental investigation ofthe effectiveness of 
manipulatives in the teaching ofprobability and statistics to university-level students. 
The study consisted of  80 non-math and science students at Purdue University enrolled in 
two different sections of  a sophomore level probability course. Before the experiment 
began, the students were ranked on the basis oftheir previous mathematics grades for 
each section.  Each ofthe two sections was divided into three treatment groups: 
Manipulative Pictorial (MP), Pictorial (P), and Symbolic (S).  In each section, the first 
three students were randomly assigned to one ofthree treatment groups.  This procedure 
continued until all students were assigned to a treatment group. 
The three treatment groups for each section met in separate tape laboratories 
during the regular class hours.  The students did not have any contact with the instructor, 
and the laboratory assistants had no knowledge ofthe purpose ofthe study.  Neither the 
students nor the assistants were told they were involved in an experiment.  They were 
told they were part ofa study on the feasibility of  video taped instruction.  During each 
class meeting, every student received a written lesson and a tape ofthe lecture.  Thus, 
students could listen to the lecture at their own pace.  Daily homework was assigned and 
returned, graded by the instructor. 
Each ofthe three groups had the same written lessons with the same objectives; 
however, the treatment differed in their lecture portion.  The MP groups performed 
experiments on random processes found in discrete probability.  The students conducted 
random experiments using coins, dice, random-number tables, and marble selection 
devices.  The students also used graphs, diagrams, and figures to motivate their learning. 22 
The P groups were similar to the MP groups; however, the P groups did not perform the 
experiments.  Instead, the P groups used data generated by the instructor.  The students 
did not see the experiments or the use ofthe physical objects being used.  The pictorial 
aspect ofthe instruction was not changed.  The S groups were similar to the P groups; 
however, the S groups did not have any pictorial aids.  The written material was altered 
and only words and mathematical symbols were used.  Overall, in the MP, P, and S 
groups, the behavioral objective and problems were identical. 
The experiment took place the first four weeks ofthe term, with the class meeting 
three times a week.  Each lecture was approximately 30 minutes long.  At the end ofthe 
experiment, an examination covering the twelve lessons was given during an evening 
meeting, so that all students took the same examination at the same time. 
The data for the experiment were collected through the students' previous math 
grades and the final exam.  The final exam consisted of  40 questions, stratified into 
cognitive levels, based on the taxonomy used in the National Longitudinal Study of 
Mathematical Abilities: comprehension, computation, application, and analysis. The 
percentages ofitems on the exam approximated the percentages ofthe behavioral 
objectives used in the lessons.  The results ofthe exam were broken into five dependent 
variables: comprehension score, computation score, application score, analysis score and 
total score. 
The analysis and results for the test were stated in two categories: students' 
previous math grades and the five dependent variables ofthe final exam.  Using the 
student's previous mathematics grades, a two-way analysis was conducted that compared 
the two factors ofclass (2 levels) and treatment (3 levels).  With a =  .05, analysis of 23 
variance indicates there was no difference between the two sections and the three 
treatment groups in their previous mathematics grades (p > .24 for the three 
comparisons).  The results from the final exam were also computed using the two-way 
analysis on each ofthe five dependent variables.  The two factors were class (2 levels) 
and treatment (3 levels).  Homogenity ofcell variance for each variable was tested using 
Bartlett's i  method. With a = .05, only the computational sub-score test rejected the 
homogenity hypothesis (p < .05 for computational, p> .05 for the other four variables). 
The rejection ofthe homogenity hypothesis indicates the assumption ofequal population 
variance was not met; thus the data did not meet the assumptions ofa two-way ANOV  A 
(Huck &  Cormier, 1996).  When the hypothesis of  no difference in the examination score 
means among the three treatment groups was rejected for a particular variable, Scheffe's 
method was used to make the pairwise comparisons oftreatment means.  Scheffe's 
method allows multiple comparison based on the F-test when the assumption ofequal 
population variance is not met (Huck &  Cormier, 1996).  In the analysis ofvariance, 
pooling was done when possible. Factors were pooled ifthe F-test was not significant at 
the .25 level.  For the total examination scores, equality oftreatment means was rejected. 
The class and interaction effects were pooled, and the Scheffe's test conducted.  The 
results from the Scheffe's test indicated the symbolic treatment mean (/-ls) was less than 
the manipulative pictorial (/-lMP) and the pictorial means (/-lp).  However, the hypothesis of 
equality ofthe manipulative pictorial mean and the pictorial mean was not rejected.  Thus 
the ordering indicated by Scheffe's method indicated /-ls < /-lP;  /-ls < /-lMP; and /-lP = /-lMP. 
The Scheffe's method also found the same ordering for the application, analysis, and 
examination scores.  However, for the comprehension sub-score, the two-way analysis 24 
permitted the pooling ofclass and interaction effects.  The resulting analysis rejected the 
equality oftreatment means.  Scheffe's test indicated that the symbolic treatment mean 
was less than the pictorial treatment mean.  However, neither the hypothesis that the 
manipulative-pictorial means is equal to the symbolic mean nor the hypothesis that the 
manipulative-pictorial means is equal to the pictorial mean was rejected.  Thus the order 
was !!s < !!p; !!s < !!MP; and !!p =  !!MP.  For the computation sub-score, homogenity ofcell 
variance was rejected with iobs(5) =  16.5.  The two-way analysis was not made.  Rather, 
two one-way analyses were made on the scores from each ofthe two classes.  With the 
separate classes, homogenity ofvariance was not rejected in either.  Neither ofthe two 
one-way analyses rejected the equality oftreatment means (p> 50, pairwise analysis of 
treatment averages). 
The results from the analysis show four major trends.  First, there was no 
difference in student computational achievement among the three instructional methods. 
Second, the use of graphs, figures, and diagrams significantly improved the student's 
application and analysis, and total examination scores.  Third, if  graphs, figures, and 
diagrams were used, then students' application, analysis and total scores do not indicate 
any significant difference between the manipulative-pictorial students and the pictorial 
students.  Finally, ifstudents did use graphs, figures and diagrams, the comprehension 
score may indicate that students who performed the manipulation did not perform as well 
as those who were only told the outcome ofthe experiments. 
Shaughnessy (1977) conducted a study on an experimental model ofmathematics 
instruction in elementary probability and statistics and how the instruction maximized the 
student's chances ofovercoming their misconceptions ofprobability and statistics.  The 25 
population for this study consisted of  80 college undergraduate students enrolled in four 
sections of  a finite mathematics course.  The four sections were randomly selected for 
this experiment from a total of  seven sections being offered that term.  The remaining 
three sections were defined to be the control group.  The experimental groups participated 
in activity based courses constructed as an alternative to the lecture method.  The 
experimental group participated in a series of  nine researcher-designed activities covering 
five probability concepts: probability, combinatorics, game theory, expected value, and 
elementary statistics. 
The nine activities were carried out in small groups offour or five students, with 
the students rotating groups for each activity.  Each activity required the groups to 
perform experiments, gather data, organize and analyze the data, and reach a conclusion 
that could be stated in the form ofa mathematical principle or model.  The role ofthe 
instructor during these activities was similar to a facilitator - clarifying students' 
questions, assisting groups stalled on a particular problem, or answering a question with a 
question.  However, the instructor did not provide the students with answers.  The control 
group continued the traditional method oflecture. 
The data for this study were collected in three areas: researcher observations, pre­
test, and post-test.  The researcher observations were mainly collected to record student­
student interactions, instructor-student interactions, and unique occurrences noted by the 
researcher. The notes taken by the researcher were not used for data analysis, but instead, 
to augment the study and to give an insight to the reader the activities and interactions 
that occurred in the experimental classroom.  The 20-question forced-choice pre- and 
post-tests used for the study were developed based on the questions used by Kahneman 26 
and Tversky in their research.  The tests measured the students' knowledge of  some 
probability concepts and for their reliance upon representativeness and availability in 
estimating the likelihood ofevents.  Besides being a forced-choice test, the test also asked 
the student to supply a reason for each response.  The two tests were identical and were 
given to both the experimental and control groups. 
The data analysis consisted of  compiling the pre- and post-test results ofthe 
experimental and control groups.  To check for possible change in students' use of 
representativeness and availability, some specific questions on the test were analyzed 
separately.  Oddly, the study does not indicate which statistical analysis was conducted to 
reach the conclusions. Hence, the results ofthe analysis were stated with their p-values, 
with no indication of  an alpha-value for comparison.  The analysis indicated that the 
experimental group was more successful at overcoming reliance upon representativeness 
(p < .05), and tend to be more successful at overcoming reliance upon availability (p < 
.19). 
The results ofthis study supported the hypothesis ofKahneman and Tversky, 
which claimed that combinatorially, naIve college students relay upon availability and 
representativeness to estimate the likelihood ofevents.  The results on the post-test 
suggest that the manner in which college student learn probability may make a difference 
in their ability to overcome misconceptions that arise from availability and 
representativeness. This experiment suggests that the course methodology and teaching 
model used in an elementary probability course can help develop student's intuition for 
probabilistic thinking. 27 
Secondary-Level Teaching Programs 
Fischbein and Gazit (1984) investigated the possibility ofinfluencing junior high 
students' intuitive probabilistic judgement through classroom instruction.  The term 
"intuition", defined by the researchers, is the cognitive belief based on a "global, 
synthetic, non-explicitly justified evaluation or prediction" (p. 2).  For their study, 
Fischbein and Gazit believed that intuitive attitudes could be developed only through 
personal involvement ofthe learner in a practical activity.  These intuitions cannot be 
modified by only verbal explanation.  Therefore, the primary purpose ofthis exploratory 
study was to evaluate probabilistic intuitions and their development under the influence 
of  systematic instruction.  A secondary purpose for this study was to explore the 
possibility that the student's age may have some impact on the learning capacity of 
probability  . 
The population for this study consisted of 18 junior high classes divided into two 
groups: experimental group and control group. The experimental group participated in 12 
lessons covering the concepts of  certain, possible, and impossible events; outcomes and 
events in a chance experiment; the concepts ofchance and of  quantifying chances; the 
concepts ofprobability and relative frequency and the relation between them; counting 
outcomes; and simple and compound events and their probabilities. 
The data for this study were collected by two open-ended questionnaires: 
Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B.  Questionnaire A was devised to assess the 
teaching effects ofthe students attending the experimental class.  Since the questionnaire 
was designed to test the extent to which the concepts taught in the experimental groups 
were assimilated correctly and efficiently, it was not administered to the control group. 28 
Questionnaire B was devised to assess the indirect effect of  instruction on the student's 
intuitively based misconceptions.  Questionnaire B was administered to both the 
experimental and control classes since it did not require special knowledge ofprobability. 
The unit ofanalysis for this study was the three grade levels ofthe classes 
participating for the study: fifth, sixth, and seventh.  The results were collected according 
to ifthe student could correctly or incorrectly answer the questions and percentages ofthe 
correct responses were calculated for each grade level. 
The results for this study were reported according to percentages. The responses 
to the first three questions indicated that distinguishing between certain, chance, and 
impossible events increased with age: with an average of  70% ofthe fifth graders able to 
give at least one example ofeach event compared to the average of  85% ofthe sixth 
graders and 95% ofthe seventh graders. 
The fourth question considered to what extent the students were able to use the 
procedure they were taught for calculating the probability ofindependent and dependent 
events (p. 4): 
In a box, there are three red marbles and four black ones.  One extracts a 
marble by chance (without looking). 
a. 	 What is the probability of  drawing a red marble? 
b. 	 What is the probability of  drawing a black marble? 
c. 	 Let us consider that the drawn marble was a black one.  After 
extracting it you put it back in the box and you make a second 
extraction.  What is the probability that this time too the extracted 
marble will be black? 
d. 	 An extraction has been performed and the extracted marble was 
black. This time, the marble is not returned to the box.  A second 
marble is drawn by chance.  What is the probability that this 
marble too, will be black? Or red? 29 
Responses of  students differed as the age ofthe students increased.  The majority of  the 
fifth graders - 76% - were not able to solve independent event problems, while 78% were 
unable to solve dependent event problems.  As the age ofthe student increased, there was 
a dramatic improvement for the solving ofindependent event problems: 70% ofthe sixth 
graders and 92% ofthe seventh graders were able to solve the independent event 
problems.  However, the ability to use the procedures taught in class to calculate the 
dependent events did not grow as fast: 42% ofthe sixth graders and 72% ofthe seventh 
graders were able to solve dependent event problems.  Through categorizing the 
responses to the question, three main categories of  misconceptions emerged, possibly 
explaining the student errors.  The first misconception was the tendency to relate the two 
sets of  marbles involved one to the other, instead of  relating the set of  expected outcomes 
to the whole set ofpossible outcomes. The second misconception was that of  expressing 
the probability as a lin ratio.  A third misconception was that the student forgot that the 
box has one less marble and does not adjust the number ofpossible outcomes 
accordingly.  The researchers defined the misconception ofthe student forgetting to 
subtract one from the number representing the whole set "coordinating capacity". 
The remaining questions on Questionnaire A for the experimental group also 
found that as the age ofthe student increased, the number ofprobability questions 
pertaining to compound events; proportional reasoning; and describing examples of 
certain, chance and impossible events, simple and compound events improved with age. 
From the results ofQuestionnaire A, it was apparent that conceptual and procedural 
acquisitions vary across the ages.  The students in the fifth grade did not benefit as much 
from the experimental class as the seventh graders.  However, this statement can only be 30 
said when comparing the percentages.  The researchers did not provide statistical 
evidence to this claim. 
Similar findings of  student's age were noticed on Questionnaire B.  The older the 
student, the more likely they were to understand the concept. Questionnaire B determined 
the students understanding ofthe conception ofluck, representativeness, negative recency 
effect, outcomes in a stochastic experiment, and proportional reasoning. Questionnaire B 
does not require special knowledge ofprobability; hence, Questionnaire B was 
administered to both the experimental and control groups.  The first question referring to 
the concept ofcertain events, the results show that the factor ofage was more effective 
than the factor of  instruction.  When asked about luck and chance, the results were the 
same for the control and experimental group.  The majority ofthe questions comparing 
the control group to the experimental group indicated there was a clear and steady 
increase with age ofthe students than ofthe affect ofthe instruction with 60-70% ofthe 
sixth graders and 80-90% ofthe seventh graders were able to understand and use 
correctly most ofthe concepts covered in class.  Unfortunately, it appeared that the 
majority ofthe concepts were too difficult for the fifth graders. 
The researchers acknowledged that they did not conduct a pre / post-test analysis 
of  the experimental group to statistically justify that the experimental lessons did or did 
not influence students' probabilistic intuitions.  The researchers also acknowledged that 
the questions posed to the students might have been too difficult for the students to 
understand, and were not appropriate for this age level.  This was apparent in the analysis 
ofthe test results from the fifth grade classes.  The fifth grade classes scored low in all 
categories - below 50% - on both questionnaires.  This may be an indication that the 31 
intuitive attitudes were not properly assessed for this age level.  Similarly, the fifth grade 
students had a difficult time understanding the true meaning ofthe questions and either 
did not answer the question or answered at random.  However, when comparing the sixth 
and seventh grade classes, the results indicated that in both the experimental and control 
groups, age was a larger factor in answering the questions correctly, than the 
experimental lesson factor. 
Observing that most mathematics teachers present probability in a traditional 
tautological manner, Castro (1998) noticed the need to develop an innovative teaching 
approach.  Traditionally, math is taught through logic with statements such as "IfP, then 
Q"; "Not P implies not Q", etc. making the learning ofmathematics more of  an empirical 
and a priori model.  However, Castro believed the learning ofprobability is more quasi­
empirical.  The quasi-empirical perceptive found in teaching probability highlights 
counter-examples, refutations, and critiques.  Since the teaching ofprobability cannot be 
compared to teaching mathematics, the learning of  probability cannot be similar to the 
learning ofmathematics.  Knowing that most mathematics teachers do want to use the 
hypothetical-deductive nature ofmathematical theories in teaching probability, teachers 
will try new strategies to form a series of  stimulating classroom activities to explicitly 
show students the mathematical relationships. However, whenever teachers get a sense of 
imbalance oftheir new teaching strategies, and at the first sign ofdifficulties in the 
educational process, they tend to return to traditional activities with which the feel more 
comfortable. Castro (1998) was interested in constructing an instructional model based 
upon conceptual change to improve student's performance in elementary probability. 
Hence, in this study, Castro looked at four main improvements in student's conceptual 32 
change with the use ofa new instructional model: performance in elementary 
calculations, performance in reasoning in probability while diminishing the biases and 
mistaken conceptions, improve students' attitudes toward mathematics compared with the 
traditional method, and a higher conceptual change in the students than that produced by 
the traditional method. 
The population for this study consisted of  six first-year high school classes in 
Madrid, Spain from three different schools.  In Spain, the first year students are typically 
14-15 years old.  The six classes were divided into two groups: experimental group and 
control group. 
The experiment consisted of 15 instructional hours on a probability theory course 
at the introductory level.  Both the experimental and control groups used the same 
textbook, course syllabus, lesson objectives, and time constraints.  The control group 
presented the content using lessons explained by the teacher, and the students solving the 
problems from the book.  The experimental group consisted of  a quasi-empirical teaching 
method.  The quasi-empirical method required the teachers to diagnose the thinking of 
the students, clarify student's ideas, carry out random experiments to encourage cognitive 
conflict, apply new ideas to new contexts, and revise the previous ideas with the 
knowledge gained through the process. 
The data for this study were collected in four categories: student performance in 
probability calculations, student performance in probability reasoning, student attitudes 
towards mathematics, and level of  student conceptual change.  The student performance 
in probability calculations was measured using a pre-test / post-test questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire asked the students about concepts in probability, principles and procedures, 33 
and problem solving tasks.  The questions had been selected from a common 
mathematics text used in Spain during the first year-high school.  The student 
performance in probability reasoning was measured using an open-ended, qualitative 
questionnaire in a pre-test / post-test format.  The questionnaire included items that dealt 
with everyday random phenomena and with deceptive situations in which the student's 
intuitions enter into conflict with the formal laws of  chance.  The items on the qualitative 
probability-reasoning questionnaire had been selected from the abundance ofliterature on 
probability thinking.  Student attitudes towards mathematics was also measured using a 
pre-test / post-test format using the Gairin's 22-item Likert Scale attitude test.  The study 
did not give further information about the attitude scale, nor did it indicate if  it is 
specifically for attitude towards math.  Finally, the level of  student conceptual change 
was measured by counting the number ofprevious mistaken conceptions that were 
positively overcome after the experimental period.  Also, the number of  previous 
conception that were correct intuitions and that the teaching did not change into incorrect 
ones. To measure this variable, the study used the results from the probability reasoning 
and calculation tests.  For the four main categories ofdata collection, the study does not 
discuss the validity or reliability of  the questionnaires, attitude test, or computing the 
conceptual change of  the students using scores from the questionnaires. 
The unit ofanalysis was the combined scores ofthe experimental groups against 
the combined score ofthe control group.  The study does not state an alpha level for a 
significant range.  The data for this study were analyzed using an analysis of  variance of 
one factor -- the treatment -- against three independent variables: performance in 
probability calculations, performance in probability reasoning, and attitudes towards 34 
mathematics.  The results indicate that comparing the dependent factor -- the treatment -­
against the probability reasoning pre-test, the probability calculation pre-test, and the 
initial attitude test, there was no statistically significant difference between the 
experimental and control groups (p> .05, no F-score reported).  This result indicated that 
both groups started with the same attitude towards mathematics and from the same level 
of skills and knowledge in probability.  Given the design ofthe experiment -- pre-test, 
intervention, post-test -- a variance-covariance analysis was conducted.  The factor was 
the two teaching models, and the covariant variables were the results ofthe intuitive 
reasoning post-test, the probability calculation post-test, and the attitude towards 
mathematics after the intervention.  The results ofthe influence of  intuition on 
performance in probability and attitude towards mathematics showed a significant 
difference existing in the mean scores ofthe probability reasoning post-test (F1,116 = 
46.18, p < .01) and the probability calculation post-test (F1,1l6= 26.30, p < .01) in favor of 
the experimental group.  There were no significant differences with regard to the teaching 
method and attitude towards mathematics after the intervention (p > .05, no F-scores 
reported). 
To analyze the conceptual change ofthe students over time, the study used the 
results from the probability reasoning and calculation tests.  First, items from the two 
tests were selected and categorized as either intuitive or counter-intuitive.  Next, each 
item was treated as a variable, and assigned a value of0,  I, or -1  based on ifthere was no 
change, a change to incorrect to correct, or a change from correct to incorrect in the 
responses from the pre-test to post-test results.  To compare the levels of  conceptual 
change between the experimental and control group, a chi-square test was used to 35 
contrast the percentage ofvalues ofeach item value.  The results indicate a statistical 
significant difference in seven ofthe 12 items used for this analysis, in which the 
percentages of 1 values are significantly higher in the experimental groups and the 
percentages of  -1  are significantly higher in the control group (no test scores reported). 
The results from this study do indicate that the instruction model based on a 
quasi-empirical and conceptual change perspective do significantly improve students' 
skills in elementary probability calculations, compared to the traditional instruction 
method.  Also the model of  instruction through conceptual change significantly improves 
student's intuitive probability reasoning, compared to the traditional instruction model. 
However, the models of  instruction through conceptual change did not modify 
significantly students' attitudes towards mathematics.  Finally, a higher level of 
conceptual change was produced in the group that followed conceptual change 
methodology than in the traditional teaching group. 
Elementary-Level Teaching Programs 
Ojemann, Maxey, and Snider (1965a) devised a guided learning program for 
helping a child learn the elementary aspects ofprobability.  In their study, they wanted to 
test the effectiveness ofthis program at the third-grade level. 
The guided learning program for this study was based upon Piaget's learning 
theory, and a learning theory constructed by the researchers.  The theoretical framework 
used for the guided learning program was (p. 321): 36 
When a child is confronted with a situation in which he has to 
make a choice or decision, the problem is one of  selecting the response 
that has the best chance ofproducing the result he desires. He thus has to 
make an estimate or a prediction.  Ifthe information he has is some way 
incomplete, the logical procedure is to put the prediction in probability 
terms. 
To make a decision in probability terms, the subject has to abstract 
"completeness ofinformation available" from other aspects ofthe 
situation, such as the size, shape, color ofthe objects with which he is 
dealing; the appearance ofthe people involved in the situation; the 
particular place where the event takes place; what others are doing, and so 
on.  When the request is made to "choose one" or "make a guess", these 
stimuli should arouse the responses, "What information about this do I 
have or can I get?" 
When a child is placed initially in a situation in which he has to 
make a decision, a variety ofresponses may be aroused depending on 
previous interaction oforganism and environment.  The responses may be 
related to various aspects ofthe situation - the people involved, the nature 
ofthe objects, ifany, that he must manipulate, the familiarity or 
strangeness ofthe situation. 
The problem in designing the sequence of  experiences is one of 
using stimuli to intensify the responses represented by "What information 
do I have?" so that when the child is asked to "make a guess", or "pick 
one", there will arise the responses represented by "What do I know that 
will help me?" and responses to other aspect ofthe situation will be 
minimized. 
The guided learning program consisted offive consecutive days of  30-minute instruction, 
discussions, and hands-on activities taught by one instructor.  The program consisted of 
discussions on various situations that occur in everyday life in which one has to make a 
best guess or prediction; the possibility of  gathering more information to help make a 
prediction; the effect ofadditional variables added to the events; and the collection of 
data and a discussion on frequency. 
The population for this study consisted of48 students within two third grade 
classes of  a mid-west elementary school.  The school was located in a section ofthe 
community consisting of  slightly above middle-class families.  One class was chosen to 37 
be the experimental group in which the students participated in the five-day guided 
learning program.  The second class was the control group.  To avoid possible Hawthorne 
Effect, the instructor also visited the control group and told them they were the 
experimental class.  However, it is unclear as to what the instructor did while he visited 
the control class.  The mortality rate consisted of  the loss of  seven students due to 
incomplete data and absences 
In lieu ofa pre-test, the researchers compared the groups according to their scores 
ofthe Verbal portion ofthe Lorge-Thorndike IQ test and the Composite and Arithmetic 
scores on the Iowa Test of  Basic Skills (ITBS). Using the t-test and not stating an alpha­
value, the study indicates that there was no statistical significant differences between the 
control and experimental groups on the Verbal IQ scores (t =  .994, no p-value reported); 
the Arithmetic ITBS scores (t = .880, no p-value reported); or the Composite ITBS scores 
(t =  .754, no p-value reported). 
The data for this study were collected through the administering of  four post-tests. 
The instructor administered two ofthe tests, and a person unknown administered the 
other two tests to both groups.  The tests were administered the week following the 
conclusion ofthe learning program, and each test was given on a separate day. The first 
test consisted of25 questions based on a situation involving the selection of  various 
proportions ofcolored objects from a bag.  The questions were presented orally, and the 
students wrote their responses.  This test yielded a reliability coefficient (KR  -formula 21 ) 
of .85 using all experiments and control subjects.  The second test consisted of  two 12­
question sections.  The first section consisted ofpredicting an image on the top card of  a 
deck based on various proportions of  shapes written on each card.  The second section 38 
consisted ofshowing the students the top card ofa deck and the students had to predict 
the image on the second card.  This test yielded a reliability coefficient (KR  -formula 21) 
of.72 using all experimental and control students.  The third test was based upon the 
Decision Location Test developed for another study.  The test consisted ofpresenting a 
series of 15 slides, beginning with a slide that displayed a small segment of  an object, and 
continuing with each successive slide adding something so that the object was practically 
complete on the final slide.  The students were asked what they thought the object was 
with each slide.  The final test consisted ofplacing a constant proportion of  black and 
white objects in a box and not allowing the students to know the proportion.  The 
students were asked to predict the color that would be drawn in the final eight blocks of 
12 predictions, knowing the first four draws. 
The unit ofanalysis was the average scores earned on the post-test for each the 
control group and the experimental group.  The results from the four post-tests were 
analyzed using a t-test comparing the experimental against the control group.  An alpha­
value was not reported for statistical significance.  The first test on predicting the color of 
the object drawn from a bag when the proportion was known showed the experimental 
group answered statistically significantly more questions correctly than the control group 
(t =  6.46, p < .01).  The second test on predicting shapes drawn on cards indicated the 
experimental group answered statistically significantly more questions correctly than the 
control group (t =  3.49, p < .01).  The results from the Decision Location Test were 
reported in two different formats: comparison ofthe mean number of guesses other than 
"don't know" prior to point of  correct perception, and comparison of  slide number at 
which "earliest guess" other than "don't know" occurs.  Comparing the mean number of 39 
guesses other than "don't know" prior to point of  correct perception indicates the 
experimental group answered all four slide presentations statistically significantly sooner 
than the control group (t = 3.29 to 4.21, p < .01  for all four examples).  Comparing the 
slide number at which "earliest guess" other than "don't know" occurs indicates the 
experimental group was able to predict three ofthe four slide presentations statistically 
significantly sooner than the control group (t = 2.56 to 4.76, p < .05 for three slide 
presentations; t =  1.70, p-value not reported for fourth slide presentation). 
On the second test, the students had to predict the color ofthe object drawn from 
a bag with an unknown constant proportion oftwo different colors.  The scores were 
compared in two categories: trials 5-8 and trials 9-12, and knowing the outcomes oftrials 
1-4.  There was no statistically significant difference in predictions between the control 
and experimental groups in either category (t = .94 and 1.27, no p-values reported). 
However, using descriptive statistics, the researchers plotted the mean scores per trial for 
the experimental group and control group on a line-graph.  The line-graph indicated that 
the experimental group consistently answered more correct responses than the control 
group. 
The results from this study indicate that the students in the experimental group 
were acquiring a considerable ability to relate their predictions to the events presented to 
them.  When information was given to them, they were able to correctly predict the 
outcome more often than the control group.  Also, they tended to wait before making a 
prediction when only a small amount ofinformation was available and more would be 
supplied. 40 
In a second study, Ojemann, Maxey, and Snider (1965b) investigated the effect of 
their guided learning program on a fifth grade class.  The population for this study 
consisted of  six fifth grade classes from three different mid-west elementary schools in 
similar neighborhoods.  Two classes from School A and one class from School B were 
assigned as the experiment group, while the three classes in School C were assigned as 
the control group.  This report does not indicate how the three elementary schools were 
chosen, how each class was assigned to an experimental or control group, or if  the 
schools had similar curriculums. 
The study consisted ofsubjecting the experimental group to a series of  five 30­
minute guided learning programs, and both the control and experimental groups watched 
two movies: "The Scientific Method" and "Weather, Why It Changes".  To avoid the 
Hawthorne Effect, both the control and experimental groups were told that they were the 
experimental group.  The five guided learning programs consisted of  short lessons on the 
discussion ofrisk, chance, prediction, and maximizing; experiments to illustrate 
difference chances of  objects ofequal probability to be drawn; discussions on predictions 
based on a proportion ofobjects with similar characteristics; the need of  information for 
predictions; discussion and experiments on conditional probability; and discussions have 
to revise predictions as additional information becomes available.  One outside instructor 
taught the five 30-minute guided learning programs to the experimental group.  The study 
does not mention ifthis instructor also visited the control groups, as in the previous 
study. However, the movies were shown by a research assistant who did not teach the 
classes. 41 
The data were collected using one pre-test and four post-tests.  Both the pre-test 
and post-test were administered to the control and experimental groups.  Also, for 
comparison, the scores ofthe Otis Group Intelligence Scale and the composite and 
arithmetic scores of  the Iowa Test of  Basic skills were collected for each student. The 
pre-test consisted of 15 questions asking the students to predict the color ofan object 
drawn from a pool ofknown proportions oftwo colored objects.  The first test consisted 
of25 questions based on a situation involving the selection of  various proportions of 
colored objects from a bag, knowing the proportion ofeach color represented.  The 
questions were presented orally, and the students wrote their responses.  The second test 
consisted of  two 12-question sections.  The first section consisted ofpredicting a shape 
on the top card of  a deck based on various proportions of  shapes written on each card. 
The second section consisted of showing the students the top card of  a deck and the 
students had to predict the shape ofthe second card.  The third test was based from the 
Decision Location Test developed for another study.  The test consisted ofpresenting a 
series of 15 slides, beginning with a slide that presented a small segment ofan object, and 
continuing with each successive slide adding something so that the object was practically 
complete on the final slide.  The students were asked what they thought the object was 
with each slide. The final test consisted ofplacing a constant proportion of  black and 
white objects in a box and not allowing the students to know the proportion.  The 
students were asked to predict the color that would be drawn in the final eight blocks of 
12 predictions, knowing the first four draws.  The study does not discuss the validity or 
reliability for the pre- and post-tests. 42 
The unit of  analysis was the average scores earned on the pre- and post-test for 
each the control group and experimental group.  The results from tests were analyzed 
using aT-test comparing the experimental to the control group.  An alpha-value was not 
reported for statistical significance.  The pre-test results indicate there is no statistical 
difference between the control group and experimental group on the IS-item pre-test (t = 
-1.57, no p-value reported), the Otis Intelligence Scale (t = -.27, no p-value reported), 
ITBS arithmetic component (t = -.62), or the ITBS composite (t = -.62, no p-value 
reported).  The first post-test on prediction the color ofthe object drawn from a bag when 
the proportion was know showed the experimental group answered statistically 
significantly more questions correctly than did the control group (t =  7.07, p < .01).  The 
second test on predicting shapes drawn on cards indicated the experimental group 
answered statistically significantly more questions correctly than the control group (t = 
3.97, p < .01).  The results from the Decision Location Test were reported in two 
different formats: comparison ofthe mean number of  guesses other than "don't know" 
prior to point ofcorrect perception, and comparison of  slide number at which "earliest 
guess" other than "don't know" occurs.  Comparing the mean number of  guesses other 
than "don't know" prior to point of  correct perception indicates the experimental group 
answered three ofthe four slide presentations statistically significantly sooner than the 
control group (t = -1.91, no p-value reported; and -2.47 to -3.18, p < .01  for the other 
three examples).  Comparing the slide number at which "earliest guess" other than "don't 
know" occurs indicates the experimental group was able to predict two of  the four slide 
presentations statistically significantly sooner than the control group (t = 2.04 to 2.44, p < 
.05 for two slide presentations; t =  1.11 to 1.33, p-value not reported for the remaining 43 
two slide presentations).  Analyzing the results for the final test, when the students had to 
predict the color ofthe object drawn from a bag with an unknown constant proportion of 
two different colors, the scores were compared for each ofthe 15 trials knowing the 
outcomes oftrials beforehand.  There was no statistically significant difference in 
predictions between the control and experimental groups for the first trial (t =  .27, no p­
values reported).  However, for the remaining 14 trials, there was a statistically 
significant difference between the control and experimental group (t = 2,25 to 5.35, P < .5 
for all 14 trials).  The results ofthe final post-test were also reported using descriptive 
statistics.  The researchers plotted the mean scores per trial for the experimental group 
and control group on a line-graph.  The line-graph indicated that the experimental group 
consistently answered more correct responses than the control group. 
The results ofthe first three post-tests indicated that the fifth grade students had 
developed a considerable ability to relate their predictions from the information available. 
The results ofthe fourth post-test, concerning the ability to predict the outcome without 
prior knowledge ofthe possible chances ofsuccess, indicate that the fifth grade 
experimental class was successful in using the information that they gathered from the 
previous events to predict the future events. 
Conclusion 
The studies investigating the effects ofprobabilistic instruction on students 
illustrate some trends and patterns. A major trend that is noticed was the recognition that 
the teaching and learning of  probability changed with age.  Ojemann, et al.(1965a, 
1965b) observed in their experimental studies on third and fifth graders that those 44 
students exposed to probabilistic instruction did improve their understanding ofbasic 
probabilistic understanding, and the experimental students waited for more information 
on an event before claiming a prediction ofthe outcome.  When conducting experiments 
with middle school level students, Fischbein and Gazit (1984) concluded that age was 
more important in student understanding ofprobability than the experiments conducted in 
class.  Finally, collegiate level studies conducted by Austin (1974) and Shaughnessy 
(1977) found that instruction improved students' probabilistic understanding and 
reasoning.  This trend indicates that age is a factor in student understanding of 
probability, and understanding ofinstruction.  This result is also supported by the 
previous findings of  Fischbein and Schnarch (1997) on the investigation ofevolution, 
with age, of  probabilistic intuitively based misconceptions. 
A pattern resulting from these studies also indicates that the method ofteaching 
may have an impact on student learning ofprobability.  Castro (1998) indicates that the 
instructional format - deductive as opposed to inductive - improves students' probabilistic 
understanding and reasoning, while changing student's misconceptions.  Collegiate level 
studies conducted by Austin (1974) showed that the use ofmanipulatives in the 
classroom did not make a significant contribution to student's learning.  However, the use 
ofgraphs, figures, diagram, and results ofexperiments significantly improved college 
student's understanding of  probability. 
Teachers ofprobability generally agree that people have a great deal ofdifficulty 
with conditional probability.  The research conducted by cognitive psychologists and 
mathematics and statistics educators had an effect on the type ofquestions that 
mathematics educators explored in the teaching and learning ofprobability.  The studies 45 
reviewed in this section indicate the possibility that age is a large factor in the 
understanding ofprobability and the method ofinstruction used in the classroom may 
affect how students learn.  The results ofthese studies allow mathematics and statistics 
educators to gain a better understanding ofhow to conduct their lessons and create a 
better curriculum. 
Research on the Framework for Students' Probabilistic Thinking in Instruction 
Jones, et al. (1997, 1999) and Tarr and Jones (1997) claim that in order to create 
appropriate curriculum, a theoretical framework ofhow students understand a concept 
needs to be developed.  Based on this theoretical framework, teachers are given a 
coherent picture of  student understanding that is needed to guide classroom instruction 
and assessment.  The next three studies included in this review illustrate their current 
work on creating a research based framework for assessing elementary and middle school 
students' probabilistic thinking. 
Previously, researchers looked at young children's probabilistic thinking, defining 
students' heuristics used to solve probabilistic problems, and conducting experiments to 
see if  instruction can improve a student's choice ofheuristics for solving the problem. 
However, Jones, et al. (1997) noticed a gap in the research on development of  a 
framework for systematically describing and predicting young children's thinking in 
probability as they learn the theory behind probability.  In their first study, Jones, et al. 
(1997) conducted a longitudinal study to develop and evaluate a possible Probabilistic 
Theoretical Framework for assessing probabilistic thinking in children.  The framework 
was developed based on four main probability constructs: sample space, probability of  an 46 
event, probability comparisons, and conditional probability.  Each ofthe four constructs 
was divided into four levels: Subjective Thinking, Transitional, Informal Quantitative, 
and Numerical Reasoning. 
Observing two third grade classes during the course ofone school year, the 
researchers collected data through three structured interviews on eight case studies 
concerning 20 probabilistic tasks.  The interviews took place during three assessment 
points during the school year: fall, winter, and spring.  Each class participated in an eight 
week Probability Problem Task Program implemented at different times throughout the 
school year. The first class took part in the program immediately following the first 
interview, and prior to the second.  The second class participated in the program after the 
second interview, and prior to the third. 
The results ofthe study were described in three areas: refinements made to the 
Probabilistic Thinking Framework, profiles and stability ofthe students' thinking across 
the four constructs, and analysis ofthe probabilistic thinking at each level. Figure 1 
shows the final Probabilistic Thinking Framework after the refinements were made from 
the interviews. 47 








SAMPLE SPACE  • Lists an incomplete set 
ofoutcomes for a one 
stage experiment 
• Lists a complete set of 
outcomes for a one-
stage experiment 
• Sometimes lists a 
complete set of 
outcomes for a two-
stage experiment using 
limited and 
unsystematic strategies 
• Consistently lists the 
outcomes of  a two-stage 
experiment using a 
partially generative 
strategy 
• Adopts and applies a 
generative strategy 
which enables a 
complete listing of  the 
outcomes for a two and 
three stage case 
PROBABILITY OF  • Predicts most/least  • Predicts mostlleast  • Predicts mostlleast  • Predicts mostlleast 
AN EVENT  likely events based on 
subjective judgements 
• Recognizes certain and 
impossible events 
likely event based on 
quantitative judgements 
but may revert to 
subjective judgements 





• Uses numbers 
infonnally to compare 
probabilities 
• Distinguishes "certain", 
"impossible", and 
"possible" events, and 
justifies choice 
quantitatively 
likely events for single 
stage experiments 
• Assigns a numerical 
probability to an event 
(it may be a real 
probability or a fonn of 
odds.) 
PROBABILITY  • Compares the  • Makes probability  • Makes probability  • Assigns a numerical 
COMPARISONS  probability ofan event 
in two different sample 
spaces, usually base on 
various subjective or 
numeric judgements. 
• Cannot distinguish 
"fair" probability 
situations from "unfair" 
ones 
comparisons based on 
quantitative judgements 
(may not quantifY 
correctly and may have 
limitations where non-
contiguous events are 
involved) 
• Begins to distinguish 
"fair" probability 
situations from "unfair" 
ones 
comparisons based on 
consistent quantitative 
judgements 
• Justifies with valid 
quantitative reasoning, 
but may have 
limitations where non-
contiguous events are 
involved 
• Distinguishes "fair" 
and "unfair" probability 







contiguous outcomes in 
detennining 
probabilities 
• Assigns equal 
numerical probabilities 
to equal likely events 
CONDITIONAL  • Following one trial of  a  • Recognizes that the  • Can detennine  • Assigns numerical 
PROBABILITY  one-stage experiment, 
does not give a 
complete list of 
outcomes even though a 
complete list was given 
prior to the first trial 
• Recognizes when 
certain and impossible 
events arise in non-
replacement situations 
probability ofsome 




incomplete and is 
usually restricted only 
to events that have 
previously occurred 
changing probability 
measures in a non-
replacement situation 
• Recognizes that the 
probability ofall event 








Table 1: Refined Probabilistic Thinking Framework for Assessing Probabilistic Thinking 
(Jones, et al., 1997, p.  111) 
The second result consists ofthe profile and stability ofthinking across the four 
constructs.  The profiles ofthe case studies indicate that the internal consistency ofthe 
child's probabilistic thinking across the constructs were consistent before instruction. 48 
However, after receiving instruction, the data indicated a lack ofinternal consistency in 
the students, with a tendency for sample space and conditional probability to lag behind 
the others. 
Third, the researchers took a closer look at the probabilistic thinking at each level, 
hoping to explain the inconsistencies among the analysis from the previous part.  From 
the recorded interviews, student responses and thinking strategies were analyzed.  Due to 
the mixture ofresponses by the students, and the various levels ofunderstanding 
recorded, the study then picked exemplary students to analyze for each of  the four levels. 
The students who represented Levell ofthinking appeared to have a narrow perspective 
in relation to probability situations.  Level I students did not recognize random 
phenomena.  These students also based their responses on subjective beliefs.  Their 
responses to sample space knowledge reflected that they could not provide a complete 
listing, but they tend to focus subjectively on what is more likely to happen than on all 
the possibilities.  Finally, in response to the other three constructs, the students used a 
subjective reasoning to answer the question, rather than rely on quantitative logic.  The 
students who represented Level 2 thinking appeared to be in a transition between 
subjective and informal quantitative judgements.  When responding to the questions 
pertaining to sample space, Level 2 students were able to identify the complete set of 
outcomes for a one-stage experiment, and partial lists for a two-stage experiment. 
Despite the greater understanding of  sample space, the students still tended to overlook 
all outcomes when asked to determine probabilities.  Still, in Level 2, the idea of 
conditional probability is still incomprehensible.  Level 2 students recognize the 
existence of  conditional probability, but they tend not to recognize the effect on the 49 
resultant probability.  The students who represented Level 3 thinking appeared to start 
using quantitative judgements in determining the probabilities.  The Level 3 students 
were not always able to use correct probabilities; however, they were able to assign 
quantitative values and make comparisons.  Level 3 students were also able to understand 
conditional probability in the sense that they recognize that the probabilities ofall events 
change in a non-replacement situation.  Finally, evidence that the students used strategies 
when listing their outcomes defined the students moving to a more quantitative 
reasoning.  The students who represented Level 4 thinking were consistently able to 
adopt the strategies and use them systematically to generate the outcomes ofan 
experiment.  Level 4 students were also able to assign and use numerical probabilities in 
both equally and non-equally likely situations.  They were able to use a generative 
strategy to list the outcomes of  both two- and three-strategy experiments, and they appear 
to use sample space as the basis for finding and comparing numerical probabilities. Their 
ability to compute probabilities effectively was also evident in their recognition and 
computation ofconditional probabilities. 
The results ofthis longitudinal study have shown that the internal consistencies of 
the students across the constructs decreased during the school year and exposure to the 
program.  However, it may not be reasonable to suggest that the level ofthe probabilistic 
thinking ofall students will follow an ordered progression through the levels of  the 
Probabilistic Thinking Framework, or even that their thinking should be consistent.  It 
was evident that ifthe student was weak in the understanding ofsample space, the level 
ofthe student's thinking continued to be low, until they were able to gain the 
understanding of  sample space. 50 
Tarr and Jones (1997) further formulated, refined, and validated a framework for 
assessing middle school students thinking in conditional probability and independence, 
based on the previous work conducted by Jones, et al. (1997).  The population for this 
study consisted of 15 students who had not been exposed to probability instruction.  The 
15 students were randomly selected from fourth and fifth grade classes in an elementary 
school and sixth, seventh, and eighth grade classes in a middle school. The randomization 
process consisted of  selecting a student from the top third, middle third, and lowest third 
in each grade based on scores of  a mathematics achievement test. 
The 15 students participated in a structured interview consisting ofeight tasks 
assessing the students on conditional probability, and six tasks assessing independence. 
From the data collected in the interviews, the researchers were able to refine their results 
and validate a new framework.  The results ofthe validation process was presented in 
three parts: refinements made to the framework following data collection, profiles and 
stability of  students' thinking across the two construction, and summaries and exemplars 
to illustrate the four levels ofprobabilistic thinking in the revised framework.  The 
refined framework was developed following the analysis ofthe case-study data.  Table 2 
illustrates the final framework. 51 








CONDITIONAL  • Recognizes when  •  Recognizes that the  •  Recognizes that the  .Assigns numerical 
PROBABILITY  "certain" and 
"impossible" events 
arise in replacement 
and non-replacement 
situations 
• Generally uses 
subjective reasoning in 
considering the 
conditional probability 
of  any even in a "with" 
or "without" 
replacement situation 




probabilities of  some 
events change in a 
"without replacement" 
situation.  Recognition 
is incomplete, 
however, and is 
usually confined to 
events that have 
previously occurred 




probabilities.  For 
example, when the 
sample space contains 
two outcomes, always 
assumes that the two 
outcomes are equally 
likely 
•  Representativeness 
acts as a confounding 




•  May revert to 
subjective judgements 
probabilities of  all 
events change in a 
"without replacement" 
situation, and that none 
change in a "with 
replacement" situation 
•  Keeps track ofthe 
compete composition 
of  the sample space in 
judging the relatedness 
of  two events in both 
"with" and "without" 
replacement situations 
•  Can quantify, albeit 
imprecisely, changing 
probabilities in a 
"without replacement" 
situation 




reasoning to compare 
the probabilities of 
events before and after 
each trial in "with" 
and "without" 
replacement situations 
.States the necessary 
conditions under 
which two events are 
related 
INDEPENDENCE  • Predisposition to 
consider that 
consecutive events are 
always related 
• Pervasive belief that 
they can control the 
outcome of  an event 
• Uses subjective 
reasoning which 
precludes any 
meaningful focus on 
the independence 




•  Shows some 
recognition as to 
whether consecutive 
events are related or 
unrelated 
•  Frequently uses a 
"representativeness" 
strategy, either a 
positive or negative 
recency orientation 
•  May also revert to 
subjective reasoning 
•  Recognizes when the 
outcome of  the first 
event does or does not 
influence the outcome 
of  the second event. In 
"with replacement" 
situations, sees the 
sample space as 
restored 
•  Can differentiate, 
albeit imprecisely, 
independent and 
depended events in 
"with" and "without" 
replacement situations 
•  May revert to the use 




independent events in 




probabilities to justify 
their reasoning. 
.Observes outcomes of 




• Reluctance or refusal 
to predict outcomes 
when events are 
equally likely 
Table 2: Refined Framework for Assessing Middle School Students' Thinking in 
Conditional Probability and Independence (Tarr & Jones, 1997, p. 48) 
The second data analysis consisted of  looking at the profiles and stability of  the 
students' thinking across the two constructs. The results indicate that 11 ofthe 15 students 
had consistency in their thinking patterns across the two constructs.  In the remaining 52 
four cases, the difference in the thinking levels were only one level apart.  These 
observations support the stability hypothesis for the framework. 
The last analysis consisted ofa closer look at the probabilistic thinking at each 
level, combining the results from each grade.  The responses and thinking of  each ofthe 
students who served as case studies were analyzed, and summaries and exemplars were 
produced to illustrate the thinking patterns outlined in the refined framework.  The 
students who represented Levell thinking appeared to rely on subjective judgements, 
ignore relevant quantitative information, and generally believe that they can control the 
outcome ofan event.  Since they reason without quantifiable justifications, Level I 
students form conditional probability judgements by constructing their own reality by 
searching for patterns which do not exist or by imposing their own system ofregularity. 
By using their own recent experience, they tend to predict or estimate the chance ofan 
event based on that experience.  In judgement ofindependence, Level I students tend to 
believe those previous outcomes always influence future outcomes, basically denying the 
existence of  independence.  The students who represent Level 2 are in transition between 
subjective and informal quantitative thinking.  When computing conditional probability, 
Level 2 students can sometimes make appropriate use ofquantitative information, but are 
easily distracted by irrelevant features.  When outcomes do not occur as expected, Level 
2 students revert to subjective outcomes.  In addition, they are still prone to assuming 
those two outcomes are equally likely when a situation has two outcomes.  Level 2 
students are able to recognize that the probabilities of some events change in "without 
replacement" situations, but recognition is incomplete and is usually confined to events 
that have previously occurred.  The students who represent the third level ofthinking are 53 
aware ofthe role that quantities play in forming conditional probability judgements. 
Without using precise numerical probabilities, Level 3 students are able to solve 
conditional probabilities through the use ofrelative frequencies, ratios, or some form of 
odds. Level 3 students can keep track ofthe sample space, especially in conditional 
probability events.  By the ability to keep track ofsample space, they are also able to 
recognize independent events.  However, Level 3 students sometimes revert to 
representativeness strategies in dealing with a series ofindependent trials. Finally, the 
students who represent the fourth level ofthinking do use numerical reasoning to 
interpret probability situations.  Level 4 students recognize sample space and its 
importance in determining conditional probability.  Level 4 students are able to calculate 
the conditional probability, while also giving a thorough explanation ofthe computations 
involved.  Using numerical thinking, Level 4 students consistently distinguish between 
independent and dependent events and can identify the conditions under which the two 
events are related.  Their reliance on numerical reasoning enables them to hold strong 
convictions when making conditional probability judgements, and these students are 
reluctant to make predictions when all outcomes are equally likely.  Finally, Level 4 
students recognize that certain outcomes do arise, even if  it is against all odds. 
Unlike the validation ofthe Probabilistic Thinking Framework conducted by 
Jones, et al. (1997), the validation ofthe Conditional and Independent Probabilistic 
Framework by Tarr and Jones (1997) was conducted through interviews of  students who 
have not had instruction on probability.  This was not a longitudinal study, nor did it 
check for student understanding after instruction.  However, the information gathered 54 
from this study can provide insight and direction for further validation of  such a 
framework on student understanding ofconditional probability and independence. 
Continuing with their interest in student's probabilistic thinking, Jones, et aI. 
(1999) used the Probabilistic Thinking Framework developed in their previous study 
(Jones, et al.  1997) to create and evaluate an instructional program in probability on 
student learning.  The main goal ofthe study was to evaluate the thinking ofthird grade 
students according to the Framework and observe possible growth due to the program. 
This longitudinal experimental study intended to evaluate the effects ofthe instructional 
program on student learning on two third grade classes during the course ofa school year. 
The researchers did acknowledge that the population for this study was the same 
as their previous study (Jones, et aI., 1997).  The population for this study consisted of 
two third grade classes.  One class was chosen to be the early-instruction group, and the 
second class was the delayed-instruction group.  Two students from each class were 
selected to be the target students for the study.  Jana and Kerry were selected from the 
early-instruction group, and Cory and Deidra were selected from the delayed class. 
The instructional program used for this study was based on the Probabilistic 
Thinking Framework created and validated in their previous study (Jones, et aI., 1997). 
Although the framework was being validated while conducting this study, the researchers 
claim "it is true that the instructional program was implemented using the unrefined 
framework.  However, reference to our validation study will reveal that minimal changes 
were made to the framework during the refinement process" (p. 490).  Hence, the 
Probabilistic Thinking Framework upon which the instructional program was based was 55 
considered to be similar enough to the refined framework, thus the instructional program 
was claimed to be based upon the refined framework as well. 
The eight-week instructional model implemented in the instructional program 
consisted oftwo main designs.  First, the instructors planned and implemented their 
instruction based on the Probabilistic Thinking Framework. The second design was 
consistent with a socio-constructivist orientation to learning.  These two key designs were 
used with the Probabilistic Thinking Framework to create the instructional program used 
in this study. 
The duration ofthe experiment was one school year.  During the year, each ofthe 
two classes participated in three probability knowledge assessments: Fall, Winter, and 
Spring.  In addition, each ofthe classes participated in the instructional program three 
different times in the school year.  The early-instruction class participated in the 
instructional program after the Fall assessment and before the Winter assessment.  The 
delayed-instruction class participated in the instructional program after the Winter 
assessment and before the Spring assessment.  By comparing the delayed-instruction 
group with the early-instruction group, it was possible to measure possible benefits ofthe 
students being exposed to additional mathematical experiences before participating in the 
instructional program.  It was noted that the delayed-instructional group only received 
more instruction on whole numbers. 
The data for this study were collected using three observational tools: research 
generated probability knowledge assessments, Mentor Summary Evaluations (MSE), and 
researcher narratives.  The research generated probability knowledge assessments were 
interviews conducted three times during the school year: Fall, Winter, and Spring.  The 56 
interviews consisted ofobserving each student in the class complete 20 tasks on 
continuous and discrete events: five sample space tasks, four probability ofan event 
tasks, seven probability comparison tasks, and four conditional probability tasks.  The 
Mentor Summary Evaluations (MSE) consisted of  three to five questions designed to help 
the mentors evaluate each student on the basis oftheir probability thinking each day.  The 
MSE allowed the study to create an ongoing profile ofeach student and their probabilistic 
thinking.  The final data collection instrument consisted ofresearcher narratives ofeach 
class session.  However, the researcher narratives were only conducted on the four target 
students - two from each class - each student being observed by a different researcher. 
On basis of  field notes, each researcher constructed a Researcher Narrative Summary 
(RNS) for their target student each session.  To augment the RNS, each target student 
was videotaped four times over the 16 sessions.  The RNS and videotapes provided a 
description ofthe target students' thinking on the mathematical tasks presented in the 
sessions.  In addition, the ongoing annotations in the notes help identify trends in the 
student's thinking. 
The data analysis consisted ofrepeated measures ofanalysis ofvariance test and a 
triangulation ofthe MSE, RNS, and videotapes.  First, the data collected from the 
probability knowledge assessment tests provided one dependent variable - the students ­
and two independent variable - the early-instruction group and the delayed-instruction 
group.  From these categories, repeated measures analysis of  variance were conducted to 
check for significant differences between the three assessment points: Fall, Winter, and 
Spring.  The data gathered by the MSE, RNS, and videotapes allowed a triangulation of 
data analysis for each ofthe four target students.  Each target student was assigned 57 
multiple codes to their 16 MSEs and 16 RNSs.  These codes were based on the four 
constructs and four thinking levels associated with the framework.  From the codes, it 
was possible to devise a time-ordered matrix allowing the display ofchanges and trends 
in their thinking levels across the four probability constructs.  The triangulation allowed 
the data to be scrutinized for consistency, commonality, and alternative interpretation of 
the data.  Data from mentors and researchers were further triangulated with assessment 
data to generate a clear perspective on each target student. 
The results ofthe data analysis were reported in three areas: descriptive analysis 
ofthe two classes, analysis ofthe two instructional groups, and analysis ofthe four target 
students.  The descriptive analysis consisted of  presenting the frequencies ofthe modal 
probabilistic thinking levels for each student at the three assessment points.  From the 
data gathered on the MSE, the frequency table indicated that immediately prior to 
instruction, the delayed-instruction group showed fewer students (n = 5) at Levell and 
more students at Levels 2 and 3 (total of 14) than the early-instruction group (n =  9 for 
Levell and n = 9 for Levels 2 and 3).  However, at the beginning ofthe school year, the 
delayed-instruction group had a similar class make-up to the early-instruction group 
(delayed group had 7 students at Levelland 12 students at Level 2 and 3, while early 
group had 9 students at Levell and 9 students at Level 2 and 3).  This discrepancy, as 
noted by the researchers, may be due to the delayed-instruction class had an increase in 
their probabilistic thinking levels during the school year without the benefits ofthe 
program. Immediately after instruction, seven students in the early-instruction and twelve 
in the delayed instruction exhibited a modal ofLevel 3 thinking.  Finally, at the end of 58 
the school year, a total ofthree students from the two classes still were at the modal of 
Level 1 thinking. 
The second set of  results consisted of  a statistical analysis comparing the two 
classes.  First, using the students probability performances measured on the assessment 
tests, a repeated measures analysis ofvariance revealed significant difference for the 
three assessment points (F2,7o =  12.88, P < .001) and significant groups by assessment 
points interaction (F2,7o  = 6.38, P < .01). Both classes had similar mean scores (early = 
12.4 and delay =  13.11), while at the second assessment point, the early instruction group 
had a higher mean than the delayed (early =  15.93, delayed =  13.95).  However, at the 
final assessment point, the roles reversed (early = 15.00, delayed = 16.63). This 
disordinal analysis was considered statistically significant (Tukey-HSD test, p < .05 in 
each case). 
The final set ofresults consisted ofan analysis ofthe four target students.  From 
the triangulation ofthe RNS, MSE, and videotaped data, a number oflearning patterns 
emerged, with four main patterns recognized.  First, there was an indication of 
misconceptions ofsample space.  The misconceptions appeared to be influenced by 
subjective judgements and were deep-seated.  The second learning pattern concerned the 
application ofpart-part reasoning.  Part-part reasoning was defined to be thinking that 
involves the relationship oftwo parts to each other.  This misconception of  part-part 
reasoning influenced students quantifying probability situations in a meaningful way. 
The third learning pattern concerned the application of  both part-part and part-whole 
relationships in probability situations.  Part-whole reasoning was defined to be thinking 
that represents the relationship ofa part to a whole.  The ability to recognize the different 59 
concepts in various situations is the key to producing growth in probabilistic thinking. 
Finally, the last learning pattern consisted ofthe use of  invented or conventional 
language.  As the students used their own language to describe the situation, it was 
beneficial for them when developing further probabilistic thinking. 
After recognizing possible emerging learning patterns, the researchers 
summarized the learning ofeach ofthe four target students: lana, Kerry, Corey, and 
Diedra. lana and Kerry were selected from the early-instruction group, and Cory and 
Deidra were selected from the delayed-instruction group.  lana reflected a student who 
was not able to understand the concept ofsample space.  Due to this, her thinking levels 
across the four constructs were unstable following instruction than prior to it. Also, the 
continual misconception of  sample space was a hindrance in her continued understanding 
ofthe other three concepts.  Despite effort during instruction to make the connection of 
sample space to the concept ofprobability, subjective judgements dominated her thinking 
in situations related to all constructs.  As mentioned earlier, this basic misconception was 
not unique.  At the beginning ofthe school year, 15 students displayed this 
misconception, and by the end of  the school year, five students still continued with this 
misconception.  Kerry reflected a student who experienced difficulty in quantifying 
probabilities.  Kerry also had difficulty with the concept of  sample space at the beginning 
ofthe school year; and her scores reflected an unstable comprehension ofthe four 
constructs after instruction.  However, once Kerry understood the concept of  sample 
space, she started to use quantitative reasoning for the other three constructs.  However, 
her difficulty was her part-part reasoning.  Kerry grouped all situations as "equally 
likely".  Kerry typifies three other students in the study who also had difficulty with part­60 
part reasoning.  Corey reflected a student who showed a growth in probabilistic thinking 
during the intervention.  Corey's initial scores indicated an unstable understanding ofthe 
four concepts at the beginning ofthe school year; however, the instruction helped him 
build his probabilistic thinking and received more uniform scores at the end.  Corey also 
had no evidence ofsubjective judgements throughout the study.  The instruction was able 
to clarify his misconceptions and by the end ofthe study, he was able to obtain Level 3 
knowledge ofprobability.  This growth in probabilistic knowledge was also evident in 19 
other students.  Finally, Deidra reflected a student who recognized the use of  fractions in 
probability, despite her misunderstanding of  sample space.  Deidra's sample space 
reasoning still consisted ofsubjective reasoning.  After instructional intervention and a 
better understanding of  sample space, Deidra was able to obtain a Level 4 understanding 
ofthe four concepts.  However, Deidra still had conflicts understanding sample space and 
tried not to let her subjective reasoning influence her decisions.  Deidra was able to 
integrate her new knowledge and apply it to probability comparisons in a more 
quantitative format.  No other student in the study was represented by Deidra's growth in 
probabilistic knowledge. 
Jones, et al. (1999) believe the results ofthis study are able to help create a more 
effective instructional program for young students.  The apparent learning patterns that 
evolved from the data analysis may have ramifications for children's understanding of 
probability.  The statistical analysis indicates both the early and delayed instruction 
groups showed significant probability knowledge growth in their performance after 
instruction.  The researchers acknowledge that the students in this study benefited from 61 
working in pairs with adult mentors, receiving individualized instruction that is not 
possible in a regular classroom. 
The Probabilistic Thinking Framework generated by these previous studies 
enables children's probabilistic thinking to be described and predicted in a coherent and 
systematic manner.  Jones, et ai. (1997, 1999) and Tarr and Jones (1997) used case 
studies to validate the Framework.  Jones, et ai. (1997, 1999) looked at longitudinal 
student profiles and the effect ofa Probability Problem Task Program, while Tarr and 
Jones (1997) interviewed students without previous instruction on probability.  During 
the case study analysis, each study made the same assumption: at any given time, a 
student's probabilistic thinking is stable across the constructs.  Although the results from 
these studies might not apply to the probabilistic thinking ofcollege students, the 
Framework does present a starting point for similar studies with college students. 
Conclusion 
This study investigates college students' understanding ofconditional probability 
and how instruction influences their thinking.  The studies examined in this literature 
review took several forms and employed many research techniques.  The samples ranged 
from third grade students (Jones, et aI., 1999; Jones, et aI., 1997; Ojemann, et aI., 1965a) 
to college level students (pollatsek, et al., 1987; Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; 
Shaughnessy, 1977; Austin, 1974).  The majority ofthe studies utilized a quantitative 
methodology to answer their research question, Five ofthe seven quantitative studies 
used the experimental model (Castro, 1998; Fischbein & Gazit, 1984; Austin, 1974; 
Ojemann, et aI., 1965a; Ojemann, et aI., 1965b) and two studies using the descriptive 62 
model (Pollatsek, et aI., 1987; Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997).  Two studies used a 
combination ofquantitative and qualitative methods (Jones, et aI., 1999, Shaughnessy, 
1977).  The final two studies used a qualitative method exclusively (Tarr & Jones, 1997; 
Jones, et. aI., 1997). 
Many studies used the results of  Tversky and Kahneman's heuristic studies on 
probabilistic intuitions as their theoretical framework for their study (Fischbein & 
Schnarch, 1997; Fischbein & Gazit, 1984; Shaughnessy, 1977).  Other studies based their 
framework on teaching methodological research and intellectual development (Jones, et 
aI., 1999; Jones, et aI., 1997; Austin, 1974, Castro, 1998). 
The probability topics covered in all eleven ofthe studies could be found in a 
typical introductory probability course.  However, some studies found the age ofthe 
student to be a limitation (Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Fischbein & Gazit, 1984). 
Among the studies measuring the effect ofa teaching program to student learning, the 
time frame ofthe instructional experiment ranged from one week (Ojemann, et aI., 
1965a; Ojemann, et aI., 1965b) to one school year or term (Jones, et al., 1997, Jones, et 
aI., 1999). 
The research highlighted several aspects ofthe influence ofinstruction on student 
understanding ofprobability.  Specifically, college students do have an intuitive 
understanding ofconditional probability (Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997, Pollatsek, et aI., 
1987; Austin, 1974); the major source oferror in computing conditional probability was 
the confusion between conditional and joint probability (pollatsek, et aI., 1987); the type 
ofcourse teaching methodology and teaching model has an influence on the development 
ofstudent's intuition ofprobabilistic thinking (Shaughnessy, 1974; Castro, 1998); and the 63 
use of  graphs, figures, diagrams, and results from experiments significantly improve 
students understanding ofprobability, while manipulations and experiments do not affect 
student understanding (Austin, 1974). 
Questions remain on how instruction influences college student's understanding of 
probability.  One issue considered by many studies was the cognitive development of  a 
student's understanding ofprobability.  Many researchers questioned the appropriate age 
for students to begin studying probability theory (Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Fischbein 
& Gazit, 1984; Ojemann, et aI., 1965a; Ojemann, et aI., 1965b).  A second issue noted by 
one study consisted ofthe effects ofmanipulatives and experiments in the college level 
mathematics classroom (Austin, 1974).  A final issue consists ofa Probabilistic Thinking 
Framework for college level students.  The Probabilistic Thinking Framework validated 
by Jones, et ai. (1997) considered the thinking ofan elementary student.  Further 
investigation for the possibility ofits applications to college level instruction could 
provide valuable insight.  The evidence addressing the question about the impact of 
instruction on college students use of  heuristics and overcoming their difficulties of 
solving conditional probability problems is obviously very limited.  What research exists 
seems to suggest that these incorrect heuristics and difficulties may be difficult to 
overcome, even with systematic instruction.  Therefore, the purpose ofthis study is to 
address the following questions: 
1. 	 What are some ofthe heuristics college students use, and what are some ofthe 
difficulties they encounter solving conditional probability problems prior to 
receiving instruction on sample space, probability of  an event, and conditional 
probability? 64 
2. 	 After attending a two-week class on sample space, probability of  an event, and 
conditional probability, in what ways did the students' heuristics change, and in 
what ways were they able to overcome difficulties they had previously 
encountered when solving conditional probability problems? 
3. 	 How does each student's understanding ofconditional probability compare to the 
Conditional Probability Framework developed by Tarr and Jones (1997)? 65 
Chapter III 

Design and Method 

Introduction 
Although there has been substantial research on students' probabilistic thinking 
(Cohen, 1957, 1960; Falk, 1986, 1988, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1982), little ofthat research has focused on student's 
probabilistic thinking in the classroom (Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Pollatsek, et aI., 
1987), and even fewer studies focus on the teaching and learning ofprobability at the 
collegiate level (Austin, 1974; Shaughnessy, 1977).  This study investigates college 
students' use ofvarious heuristics, the difficulties they encounter when solving 
conditional probability problems, and how instruction influences their understanding. 
This is accomplished through a Probability Knowledge Inventory (see Appendix A) and 
semi-structured interviews with students enrolled in a mathematics course at a medium­
sized state university.  The interviews explore the student's knowledge of  sample space, 
probability, and conditional probability and demonstrate in what ways instruction may 
influence student's use ofheuristics and assist them in overcoming their difficulties in 
solving conditional probability problems. 
The research questions are: 
1.  What are some ofthe heuristics college students use, and what are some ofthe 
difficulties they encounter solving conditional probability problems prior to 66 
receiving instruction on sample space, probability ofan event, and conditional 
probability? 
2. 	 After attending a two-week class on sample space, probability ofan event, and 
conditional probability, in what ways did the students' heuristics change, and in 
what ways were they able to overcome difficulties they had previously 
encountered when solving conditional probability problems? 
3. 	 How does each student's understanding ofconditional probability compare to the 
Conditional Probability Framework developed by Tarr and Jones (1997)? 
Subjects 
The population for this study consisted of20 students enrolled in a contemporary 
mathematics course at a comprehensive university in the Pacific Northwest.  This 
institution was chosen for three reasons.  First, the location made it convenient for the 
study.  Second, the majority ofthe students enrolled in the mathematics course had had 
no formal instruction in probability.  Third, the researcher was the instructor for the class. 
The 10-week contemporary mathematics course was designed as a terminal 
mathematics course to satisfy the baccalaureate core requirement for students not 
majoring in math, science, or engineering.  The text adopted for the course was 
Mathematics in Life, Society, and the World by Parks, Musser, Burton, and Siebler 
(2000).  The authors' intent for this book was to provide students with an enjoyable 
mathematics class while illustrating the necessity of  mathematics in their lives.  The 
material covered in this course was designed to give the students a fundamental 67 
background in statistics, computing interest rates, probability, management mathematics, 
and game theory. 
The students involved in this study were participants in a program designed to 
assist in the retention ofminority, disadvantaged, and disabled students who have 
traditionally been denied equal access to higher education.  This program serves those 
who mayor may not meet the current university admission requirements, but are 
recognized as having the potential to complete a college degree program. 
The class consisted of  a wide variety ofstudents with various backgrounds. 
Students ranged from 18 to 42 years old, eight were freshmen, three were sophomores, 
seven were juniors, and two were seniors.  The subjects in this study did not have strong 
backgrounds in college level mathematics.  Only nine students indicated they had had 
other college level mathematics courses prior to enrolling in the course, and none ofthe 
students had previously enrolled in this course.  Only four students in the group indicated 
that they had had any previous work in probability.  Two ofthe students had previously 
taken courses taught by the researcher. 
At the beginning ofthe term, the students were presented a short description of 
the study and they were asked for their cooperation.  At that time, the entire class was 
given Class Participation Informed Consent Forms (see Appendix B), explaining their 
involvement in the experiment as a class, and Interview Participation Consent Forms, for 
those who were interested in participating in interviews.  Five female students 
volunteered to be interviewed, one participant was a prior student ofthe instructor. 68 
Overview ofTwo-Week Probability and Conditional Probability Instruction 
The entire class participated in a two-week probability and conditional probability 
unit during the fourth and fifth week ofthe course.  Instruction occurred in three, 50­
minute classes per week and the instruction over the six days covered the entire chapter 
on probability and conditional probability.  The purpose ofthis section is to describe the 
two-week instruction, including a description ofthe teaching objectives, questions posed 
to the class, and classroom activities in which the students participated. 
Day 1: Defining Probability Terminology 
The goal for the first day was to familiarize students with the terminology 
associated with probability and to conduct an experiment using the new terminology. 
The class began with a discussion ofthe following problem written on the board: 
How would you interpret: 
1. 	 Your roommate contracted the measles.  You had a measles 

immunization shot; however the doctor told you, you still 

have a 10% chance ofcontracting the measles. 

2. 	 The probability ofa clear sky today is 80%. 
3. 	 Your morning cereal box claims there is a game ticket inside. 

The chance of  winning the grand prize is 1 in 150,000. 

The class discussed the possible interpretation of  each statement, and developed a 
consensus on each ofthe interpretations.  The students were then given a simple 
experiment: toss a coin twice and record the results.  Prior to conducting the experiment, 
the students were asked what type of  questions could be asked, what are the answers to 
the questions, and how would you interpret these answers.  As a class, the students 69 
developed a working definition for probability.  Using the simple experiment as a 
guideline, the class generated definitions for the experiment, sample space, and possible 
outcomes.  Allowing further exploration oftheir definitions, the class generated data for 
this experiment by reproducing the experiment 20 times.  Once the data was generated, 
the students calculated the percentages ofeach outcome.  Then the students were asked if 
the results were reasonable, and ifthey could state a theoretical solution. 
For the remainder ofthe class, the students were placed into five groups.  Each 
group was asked to generate data for five different experiments, compute the 
experimental probability, and discuss what the group believed to be the theoretical 
probability for each outcome (see Appendix C).  The results from the experiments were 
written on the board for presentation and discussion the next day. 
Day 2: Computing Simple Probability 
The main goal for the second day was that students would define probability and 
compute simple probabilities for various experiments and events within the experiment. 
At the beginning of  class, each ofthe five groups presented their experiments, from the 
day before, and explained how they calculated the experimental and theoretical 
probability for their experiments.  After the entire class agreed upon the solutions, the 
class was asked ifthe working definition constructed the day before could be refined.  At 
this time, the class agreed on a final definition ofprobability: the relative frequency at 
which we can expect an outcome to occur.  As reinforcement ofthe concept of 
probability and some ofthe properties the students noticed, the students were shown the 70 
Properties ofProbability, and asked to summarize each property, in their own words, for 
homework. 
The terms "equally likely" and "events" were written on the board, and the groups 
were asked to use previous experiments, as examples to develop definitions for these two 
terms.  The discussion on the definitions involved students questioning the sample space 
of  certain events.  From this dilemma, the students developed a general equation for the 
Fundamental Counting Principle of  an experiment with two events: if  an event A can 
occur in x ways, and for each ofthese x ways, and event B, can occur in y ways, then the 
number ofways events A and B can occur, is x times y.  Using their prior experiments as 
examples, each group was able to list the entire sample and confirm its size using the 
Fundamental Counting Principle. 
Allowing each group to reevaluate their experiments with the event listed on their 
worksheet, each group derived the probability ofthe event.  Each group also defined two 
more events that could stem from their experiment, and calculated the probability ofeach 
ofthose events.  These results were reported in a whole class discussion. 
Day 3: Computing Probability in Complex Experiments 
The goal ofthe third day was for the students to recognize a complex experiment, 
to list all the possible outcomes using a tree diagram, and, using the tree diagram, to 
derive various probabilities for each defined event.  The class began with a discussion of 
the following questions written on the board: 71 




a.  HTHT 
b.  TTHH 
c.  HTTT 
d.  HHHH 
e.  None of  these - explain why not. 
After the discussion ofthe problem, the class was asked to define the term 
experiment.  Referring to the previous experiments conducted in class, the students were 
shown which experiments were simple experiments and which experiments were 
complex experiments.  Based on this comparison, the students developed a definition for 
experiment and complex experiment.  Those groups who did have a complex experiment 
were then asked how they derived all the outcomes for the sample space.  The 
explanations led in a discussion on various methods for listing the elements in a sample 
space of  a complex experiment, and further use ofthe Fundamental Counting Principle 
developed the day before. 
Given the experiment offlipping a coin, then rolling a die, the students were 
shown a method called "Probability Tree Diagram".  Pros and cons ofa Probability Tree 
were discussed against the other methods ofgenerating sample space and probability of 
various events used by the other groups.  The students practiced the concept of 
developing a Probability Tree Diagram on other experiments.  Combining ideas together, 
the students tried to apply the Fundamental Counting Principle to the Probability Tree. 
The class concluded with the students constructing a Probability Tree to list all 
the possible outcomes offlipping a coin four times, stating the probability of  each event, 
and reaching a class consensus ofthe solution posed at the beginning ofclass. 72 
Day 4:  Introduction to Conditional Probability 
The goal for the fourth day was to introduce the students to the concept of 
conditional probability and to compare it to simple probability.  The class began with a 
discussion ofthe following questions written on the board: 
A jar contains two white balls and two orange balls.  Two balls are 
drawn, in order, without replacement. Find the following: 
1. 	 What is the probability that the second ball is white, given that 
the first ball was white? 
2. 	 What is the probability that the second ball was white? 
3. 	 What is the probability that the first ball was white, given that 
the second ball was also white? 
This problem generated an extensive discussion on logic, syntax, and language of 
probability.  As a class, the students determined the probability for each situation, using 
past knowledge.  After discussing the problems, the instructor wrote the definition of 
conditional probability on the board.  From this definition, the students re-calculated the 
probabilities.  After the students were satisfied with their answers, the remaining class 
time was devoted to discussing solutions to conditional probability problems.  The 
conditional probability problems discussed were similar to the type ofproblems found on 
the Probability Knowledge Inventory, in which the condition event in the problem is the 
change in the sample space. 
Before the end ofthe class, the students were assigned the Monty's Dilemma 
Problem (See Appendix D for the actual assignment).  Students were asked to prepare 
their answers before the sixth class session. 73 
Suppose you're on a game show, and you are given the choice of 
three doors.  Behind one door is a car, behind the other two doors are 
goats.  You pick a door, say number 1, and the host, who knows what's 
behind the doors, opens another door, say number 3, which has a goat. 
He says to you, "Do you want to pick door number 2?".  Is it to your 
advantage to switch your choice ofdoors?  If  you were the contestant, 
which ofthe following strategies would you choose, and why? 
a. 	 Strategy 1 (stick): Stick with the original door. 
b. 	 Strategy 2 (flip): Flip a coin, stick if it shows heads, and 
switch if  it shows tails. 
c. 	 Strategy 3 (switch): Switch to the other door. 
Day 5: Conditional Probability and Independence 
The goal of  the fifth day was to review the concept ofconditional probability, 
observe the probability ofindependent events.  The class started with a review of 
conditional probability, and students computed conditional probability using Venn 
diagrams and data tables.  After a review ofconditional probability, its definition, and 
applications, the students were asked the following question: 74 
Roll a 4 sided, fair die, with the numbers 1,2,3, and 4 written on the faces. 
a)  What is the probability of  rolling a 3 on the first roll? 
b)  Roll the die again.  What is the probability ofrolling a 3, given 
that you rolled a 2 on the first roll? 
After a long discussion, the class concluded that the outcome ofthe second roll was 
independent ofthe first roll.  This example led to a discussion ofindependent events. 
After developing a definition of  independent events, the students listed independent 
experiments and computed their probability. 
To review the concepts covered during the past two weeks, the class was divided 
into the same five groups, and asked to develop problems and solutions for a practice 
mid-term review sheet. 
Day 6: Monte's Dilemma 
Each chapter ofthe text used for this course concluded with a "real world" 
problem.  This problem in the chapter on probability was the Monte's Dilemma Problem. 
On the fourth day, the students were given background information on Monte's Dilemma, 
and were asked to prepare a solution to the problem.  The various solutions were 
discussed, and the class did not come to a consensus on the result.  Since the class was 
only 50 minutes, the students were given worksheets to guide them through the problem 
(see Appendix E).  Also to save time, the class was divided into three groups and each 
group was assigned a particular strategy: 
• 	 Strategy 1 (stick): Stick with the original door. 
• 	 Strategy 2 (flip): Flip a coin, stick if  it shows heads, and 
switch if  it shows tails. 
• 	 Strategy 3 (switch): Switch to the other door. 75 
At the end ofclass, each group reported the results oftheir strategy.  For homework, the 
students were asked to analyze the data presented by each group, derive a conclusion to 
the question, and justify their solution to the following question: 
If  you were the contestant, which ofthe following strategies would 
you choose? 
a. 	 Strategy 1 (stick): Stick with the original door. 
b. 	 Strategy 2 (flip): Flip a coin, stick ifit shows heads, and switch 
if  it shows tails. 
c. 	 Strategy 3 (switch): Switch to the other door. 
Conclusion 
Data for this study was collected prior to and after this two-week instruction on 
sample space, probability, and conditional probability.  The two-week instruction on 
probability gave the class a general overview ofconditional probability, mainly exploring 
conditional problems in which the removal of  an outcome from a sample space affects the 
probability of  an event.  This course was not designed to be an in-depth study ofthe 
concept ofconditional probability. 
Data Collecting Procedures 
Data collection occurred in two stages, with two parts in each stage.  The first 
stage consisted ofadministering the Probability Knowledge Inventory (see Appendix A) 
to the entire class prior to the two-week instruction on sample space, probability, and 
conditional probability.  After the administration ofthe Probability Knowledge Inventory, 
the researcher interviewed the five participants, assessing the participant's solutions to the 76 
various tasks on the Inventory.  The second stage occurred after the two-week instruction 
on sample space, probability, and conditional probability.  The second stage was similar 
to the first.  The Probability Knowledge Inventory was administered to the entire class, 
followed by an interview assessing the participants thinking on the various tasks in the 
Inventory. 
The researcher constructed the Probability Knowledge Inventory, an open-ended 
questionnaire based on the course curriculum and the literature on conditional probability 
(Jones, et aI,  1997, 1999; Tarr & Jones, 1997; Parks, et aI, 2000).  The Probability 
Knowledge Inventory comprised seven tasks in which three assessed thinking of  sample 
space; three assessed thinking of  probability, conditional probability, and comparing 
probability; and one assessed thinking in independence.  The sample space task focused 
on the student's ability to identify the complete set ofoutcomes in a one-stage or a two­
stage experiment.  The conditional probability task focused on the probability situations 
involving "with" and "without" replacement conditions.  The final task in independence 
assessed whether the student could recognize independent and dependent trials, thus 
recognizing when conditional probability is the appropriate method ofcomputation.  The 
broad array ofprobability tasks allowed the researcher to assess the probabilistic 
background ofthe students, prior to assessing problems on conditional probability.  Face, 
content, and construct validity was verified by mathematics educators, probability 
theorists, and course curriculum developers.  A pilot study ofthe Probability Knowledge 
Inventory was conducted with students enrolled in an intermediate algebra course the 
previous term.  The material covered in the intermediate algebra course was considered 
the prerequisite for students enrolled in the course involved for this study. 77 
The Probability Knowledge Inventory provided the design of  the semi-structured 
interview protocol conducted prior to, and after, the instruction on probability.  A semi­
structured interview consists ofasking a series of  structured questions and then probing 
more deeply using open-form questions to obtain additional information (Gall, Borg, and 
Gall, 1996).  The researcher asked participants to explain their solutions to the seven 
tasks on the Inventory, and to explain their choice ofsolution strategies.  Pilot interviews 
conducted with two intermediate algebra students were valuable in providing information 
on communication problems, evidence ofinadequate motivation on the part ofthe 
interviewees, and other clues that suggested the need for rephrasing questions or revising 
the procedure.  Interviews were aUdiotaped and transcribed for subsequent analysis. 
Data Analysis 
Due to the nature ofdata collection, qualitative analysis was used to address the 
questions ofinterest.  One ofthe main characteristics ofqualitative research is its focus 
on the intensive study of  specific instances ofa phenomenon.  More specifically, this 
study focused on case study analysis, a particular approach in qualitative analysis (Gall, 
Borg, & Gall, 1996).  One advantage ofa case study is its possibility ofan in-depth 
attempt to understand an individual, allowing the researcher to seek and to explain, not 
merely to record, an individual's behavior (Ary, Jacobs, & Razavieh, 1990).  Researchers 
generally do case studies for one ofthree purposes: to produce detailed description ofa 
phenomenon, to develop possible explanations ofit, or to evaluate the phenomenon (Gall, 
et al., 1996).  For this study, since the questions of  interests are descriptive in nature, the 
purpose of  this qualitative case study analysis was to provide a detailed description of 78 
students' strategies and the difficulties they encountered solving conditional probability 
problems prior to and after receiving instruction on sample space, probability, and 
conditional probability. 
The analysis ofthe data occurred in three stages: pre-instructional interviews, 
post-instructional interviews, and comparisons ofpre- and post-instructional interviews. 
The process ofanalyzing the pre- and post-instructional interviews was identical.  During 
these interviews, the researcher noted difficulties students experienced while solving the 
problems as well as interesting statements made by the student.  Once the interviews 
were transcribed, the researcher analyzed them by reading the transcriptions, searching 
for difficulties that may have been overlooked during the interview, and examining 
statements made by the student.  The collection of  student's problems and statements 
formed preliminary categories ofproblem solving strategies and difficulties encountered 
by the students while solving the problems.  The researcher then reread the transcripts 
searching for disconfirming evidence ofthese categories.  In order to stay focused on 
each case study, the researcher analyzed all the data for each individual at one time. 
Once sufficient evidence and patterns were developed for the individual case study, the 
first draft ofthe case study was written. 
At the conclusion ofthe two-week instruction, the five participants returned for a 
second interview.  A similar process ofchecking for patterns, statements, and drafts 
describing the participants continued for the second interview.  However, during the 
analysis ofthe second interview, the notes and drafts ofthe previous interview were not 
referred to in order to lessen the possibility ofbias towards observations ofcertain 
patterns, while unintentionally ignoring others. 79 
The final data analysis stage consisted ofcomparing the pre- and post­
instructional interviews and noting similarities and differences in the pre- and post­
instructional interviews for each participant and among the group ofthe five participants. 
Based on the results ofthe three stages ofdata analysis, the results from the study could 
be compared to previous research on the teaching and learning of  conditional probability. 
Summary 
Ultimately, the purpose ofdescriptive case study analysis is to provide rich 
portraits ofthe heuristics the students used and the difficulties they encountered solving 
conditional probability problems prior to and after instruction on sample space, 
probability, and conditional probability.  Data collection consisted ofthe administration 
ofthe Probability Knowledge Inventory and semi-structured interviews assessing the five 
participants.  From this data, case study analysis allowed for a description of  each 
participant's use ofheuristics and the difficulties they encountered solving conditional 
probability problems.  Together, the analysis and results from previous studies create a 
profile ofthe heuristics students used and difficulties they encountered solving 






Through the Probability Knowledge Inventory and semi-structured interviews, 
this investigation attempted to serve two main purposes.  The first purpose was to gain a 
better understanding ofcollege students' use ofheuristics and the difficulties they 
encounter solving conditional probability problems prior to and after attending a two­
week class on sample space, probability ofan event, and conditional probability.  The 
second purpose ofthe investigation was to compare the results found in this study with 
prior research on the teaching and learning ofconditional probability.  In order to achieve 
these two purposes, this chapter has two objectives.  The first objective is to  portray each 
ofthe five participants prior to and after instruction.  The portraits include a description 
ofthe heuristics the participants used and the difficulties they encountered solving 
probability and conditional probability problems.  The second objective is to analyze the 
data in response to the three research questions: 
1. 	 What are some of  the heuristics college students use, and what are some ofthe 
difficulties they encounter solving conditional probability problems prior to 
receiving instruction on sample space, probability ofan event, and conditional 
probability? 
2. 	 After attending a two-week class on sample space, probability ofan event, and 
conditional probability, in what ways did the students' heuristics probability 81 
change, and in what ways were they able to overcome difficulties they had 
previously encountered when solving conditional probability problems? 
3. 	 How does each student's understanding ofconditional probability compare to the 
Conditional Probability Framework developed by Tarr and Jones (1997)? 
Case Studies: Portraits ofthe Five Participants 
The presentation ofthe data consists ofa portrait ofeach ofthe five participants. 
The portraits include information about the student's mathematics and probability 
background, their attitudes towards mathematics, the heuristics they used to solve the 
problems, and difficulties they encountered during the first and second administration of 
the Probability Knowledge Inventory.  The five students who volunteered to participate 
in this study are called Angela, Beth, Cathy, Debra, and Emily.  Pseudonyms are used to 
assure the anonymity ofthe study participants. 
The descriptions ofthe heuristics students used to solve the probability problems 
include five categories: probability, percentage, ratio, odds, and rationalization. The term 
"probability" indicates the participant used the definition and properties of  probability to 
solve the problem.  "Percentage" indicates that the participant used either properties of 
probability or properties ofpercentages to solve the problem; however, the participant 
used percentages when stating the results.  "Ratio" indicates that the participant compared 
one group to another group to solve the problem.  "Odds", though similar to ratio, 
indicates that the participant stated that they solved the problem using odds.  Ifneither the 
concept ofratio or odds was implied, it is assumed the student was using ratio to solve 
the problem.  Finally, when the participant did not seem to use one ofthe previously 82 
stated heuristics, but used prior mathematical or practical knowledge such as reasoning 
skills or intuition, the student was defined to be "rationalizing" the solution. 
Angela 
Angela was a 19-year-old freshman who said she would rather play golf  than 
attend a mathematics class.  Despite her strong background in mathematics, including 
successful completion ofcollege level algebra, Angela was unsure ofher future academic 
goals.  She knew she did not want to pursue a career in mathematics or science, so she 
was currently pursing a Liberal Arts degree.  Angela was briefly exposed to probability in 
two of  her high school classes, Geometry and Algebra II.  When asked which probability 
concepts she recalled from these previous classes, Angela could not remember what 
topics were covered and did not remember studying conditional probability. 
Angela appeared to approach the problems on the Probability Knowledge 
Inventory as word problems with specific algorithms.  Angela claimed on Problem 1: 
"Then I was thinking, OK, this is probability, so I added them all up".  From there, when 
starting to explain each problem, she would start with "I add them (the number of 
possible outcomes) all up ...  ", and proceed with solving the problem.  Although the first 
two problems only asked for the outcomes ofthe sample space ofthe experiment, Angela 
used her algorithm to find the total ofall the numbers. 
I:  Problem 2: Spin both spinners.  If  you were to sum up the total of 
the numbers selected on the two spinners, what are all the 
possibilities you could get? 
S:  Um, I just, um, the first little spinner has a 1 and a 2 and the next 
has a 3 and a 4, so you can either get a 1 and a 3; or a 1 and a 4; 
or a 2 and a 4; and a 2 and a 3 for the spinners.  Then I added 83 
them all up and I got 20 for that one.  That's what I got on that 
one. 
Angela acknowledged her dislike for word problems in the first interview and she 
appeared to have difficulty approaching the problems on the Probability Knowledge 
Inventory.  During the administration ofthe Inventory, she asked for clarification of 
Problem 2, and during the interview, she said that she did not understand Problem 3 or 7. 
Angela seemed to feel more comfortable asking about the problems, and she was able to 
discuss her solutions in more depth.  A second indication that she struggled with the 
intent ofthe problems was during the administration ofthe test.  Angela gave more 
elaborate solutions to Problems 1 and 2 than was required.  Problems 1 and 2 asked her to 
list the sample space for the experiments.  For Problem 1, Angela calculated the 
probability for each outcome, and for Problem 2, she stated various combinations of 
possible sums. 
I:  Problem 1: In a bag, there are 4 green marbles, 3 red marbles, and 
2 yellow marbles.  Ifyou close your eyes and draw a marble from 
the bag, what possible colors could your marble be? 
S:  I thought, first, I was like OK, there could be green, red, and 
yellow marbles.  Then I was thinking, OK this is probability, so I 
added up all, um, 4,3 and 2 ...  And got 9.  Right?  Ok, so I thought 
there was a 4 to 9 chance I could get green because there are four 
marbles, and then I thought there is a 3 to 9 chance I could get red 
and then a 2 to 9 chance I could get yellow.  So I thought the best 
probability would be 4 out of9, with green, and that's what I 
thought on that one. 
Despite her confusion with the statement ofthe problem, during the interview, 
Angela was proficient at finding the entire original sample space and computing simple 
probabilities.  When first starting to solve the problems, her solutions were stated as 84 
probabilities, but by Problem 6, she started to use the concepts ofratios and odds, while 
interchanging the terminology, sometimes incorrectly.  Angela was unsure why she 
switched from "there is a 4 to 9 chance I would get it (a Snickers bar)", to "there is a 3 to 
2 ratio that boys will be picked".  However, her inconsistency between ratios, odds, and 
probability did confuse her for Problem 6d when she responded "he (Rick) still has a 1 to 
3 possibilities (of  winning), so it has changed.  Before he had 1 to 4, now he has 1 to 3". 
Where 1 : 4 and 1 : 3 are the correct ratios for this problem, and 1 out of  5 and 1 out of  4 
are the correct probabilities for this problem. 
In the problems containing a condition, Angela had difficulty computing the new 
sample space.  First, she was able to recognize the change in the sample space ofthe 
number ofcandy bars in Problem 4b, and the change in the sample space ofthe number 
ofcandidates in Problem 6b; however, Angela was frustrated by the calculations needed 
to answer Problem 5c.  Angela noted a difference in sample space after the blue marble 
was replaced and was able to apply it to her probability, but was unable to notice the 
change in the sample space for her friend's probability. 
I:  Problem 5c: Your teacher chose a blue marble, and did not 
replace it.  Suppose your teacher has another drawing the 
following day.  Has your chance ofwinning the second day 
changed, or is it the same as the day before?  Has your friend's 
chance ofwinning changed, or is it the same as before? 
S:  Urn, I thought to myself that, mine became equal, like .. .It says, 
OK, and then my friend's has not changed, there is still only one 
marble in there, but there is only, there's three blue ones and now 
three green ones, and two red, and one yellow.  So now there is 
about an equal chance that blue and green, there is a same 
probability that the blue and green could be picked, so I said 
mine changed too, so, mine changed. 
I:  And your friend's has not changed? 
S:  Yes, my friend's stayed the same.  Yea! 85 
Problem 6 seemed to confuse Angela.  It was intended to check if  Angela 
understood the concept ofindependent events.  This problem followed three conditional 
probability problems in which the sample space and probability changed among the 
solutions.  Angela seemed to have difficulty knowing where to begin solving Problem 6: 
I:  Problem 6: You rolled the die and got a 2.  Now you are going to 
roll the die again.  Does the outcome ofthe first roll affect the 
possibility ofrolling a 2 the second time? 
S:  I said no.  I said no because I thought ... OK, I think the 
probability does change, but I do not know how.  I really don't.  I 
think it does change, but I don't know how to explain it, how to 
do it.  So, I just said no. 
On the first administration ofthe Probability Knowledge Inventory, Angela used 
two main heuristics: the use ofprobability to reason a solution, and "adding them all up". 
Angela tended to have the most difficulty in understanding what the problem was asking, 
distinguishing between reporting a solution using ratios or proportions, and comparing 
probabilities after a conditioning event has occurred.  With these various heuristics and 
difficulties, Angela was not confident in her solutions. 
Angela claimed that after the two weeks ofinstruction, she felt more confident in 
her solutions to the second administration ofthe Probability Knowledge Inventory. 
Angela started the interview stating" The first one, I was totally guessing my answer, 
because it has been a long time.  But I know this one (referring to this test), I did it way 
different than I did the first time.  I felt a little more confident.  I did feel better about it". 
For Problems 1,2, and 3, Angela was able to grasp the idea that the sample space 
consisted ofcombinations ofpossible outcomes, but she was not able to compute the 
sample space for Problem 3.  When asked in Problems 2 and 3 how she knew when she 86 
had all ofthe possible outcomes, despite Angela listing the entire sample space for 
Problem 2, she could not justify how she knew she had the entire sample space.  On 
Problem 3, Angela was not able to list the entire sample space, nor state the number of 
outcomes in the sample space.  These second responses to Problems 1, 2, and 3 were 
unlike her first attempt.  During the first administration of  the Inventory, Angela had 
difficulties understanding the question ofinterest in Problems 2 and 3.  Also, Angela was 
not able to state the sample space for Problems 2 and 3. 
The frustration ofnot being able to describe the sample spaces did not hinder 
Angela's thinking for the remaining problems.  For Problems 4 and 5, Angela solved the 
problems, and justified her solutions using probability.  However, in Problem 6, Angela 
switched her solutions between ratios and probability.  On the previous administration of 
the Inventory, Angela interchanged the use ofratio and odds to state her solutions.  When 
asked why she used the two different methods on the second test, and ifthey were the 
same process, Angela could not give a reason.  It was not evident that Angela recognized 
there was a difference between the two methods of  solving the problem: 
I:  So, my question is, in Problem 6a, "who is more likely to become 
class president, a boy or a girl", your answer was "most likely a 
boy with a ratio of3 to 2".  On Problem 6b, "is it more likely 
Rick will be chosen", your answer was "Rick has a lout of  5 
chance to be chosen".  Is there a difference between reporting a 
solution as 3 to 2 compared to 1 out of  5? 
S:  Is there a difference ... Well, this is there is 2 girls and 3 boys, and 
here it says Rick, so that is one person, so I said Rick is one 
person out of  5. 
I:  Do you know why you reported some answers using ratios, and 
others using probability? 
S:  Do I know why  ...  Urn, well there is a probability that ifthis is 
boys, I don't know ... the probability 1 to 5 ... hmm, I just looked 
at it as a ratio.  I know there is a probability, probability that there 
will be 3.  Hmm  .. .I don't know. 87 
I:  Where are you getting the 3 and the 2 (written on her Inventory)? 
S:  I don't know why.  Maybe I shouldn't have written those down. If 
you want a probability, like there is lout of  5, like with Rick, 
which I got.  And then with boys and girls, there is 3 boys out of 
2 girls.  There is 2 girls to 3 boys.  I am thinking there is a 3 to 2 
ratio that  .. .I don't know  ... 
I:  I was wondering why you are reporting in ratio for those two 
problems and probability for the other two. 
S:  I don't know. 
Angela did have some difficulty with solving the conditional probability 
problems.  At first, she did not recognize that the sample space changed, hence the 
probability changed.  However, while explaining her reasoning behind her solutions, she 
was able to correct herself: 
I: 	 Problem 4c: Has your chance ofdrawing a Snicker's bar in part 
(b) changed, or is it the same chance as in part (a)? 
S: 	 Uhm, well, it is the same. 
I: 	 Why is it the same? 
S: 	 Because you still have a 4 to 9 probability that you will pick a 
Snicker, no you don't.  Oh, no ... now there is only 8 possibilities, 
and now there is only 8 Snickers, so this outcome is right.  There 
is only 8. 
I: 	 What does the 8 represent? 
S: 	 Because you took one ofthe Hershey bars away, so now there is 
only 8 possible candy bars.  And so, yea  ... there is half  and half... 
but there is still 4 Snickers. 
I: 	 Returning to the question, has the chance ofselecting a Snickers 
bar changed? 
S: 	 No. 
I: 	 It has not changed. 
S: 	 No, yea! Ok.  It's changed from ...  yea those are different.  Yes, 
they are different. 
I: 	 How do you know they are different? 
S: 	 Because the outcomes have changed.  Instead of9, there is now 8 
possible outcomes. 
I: 	 Where are the 9 and the 8 coming from? 
S: 	 How many candy bars you have  ... 88 
Angela was able to use the reasoning from Problem 4 and apply it to Problem 5 and 
report the correct solution.  On the Inventory, Angela wrote the response that her friend's 
chance ofwinning has not changed, but after looking at Problem 4 again, Angela decided 
to write out the sample space and solve the problem on a piece of  paper: 
I:  Problem 5c: And then has your friend's chance of winning 
changed, or is it the same as before? 
S:  What did my friend have again? 
I:  Yellow. 
S  :  Yellow ... he had lout of  9  . Yea, his has changed because he now 
has ... it was 1 to 10, now it is 1 to 9 that he could get picked. 
I:  What do the 9 and the 10 represent? 
S:  All the marbles.  All ofthe possible outcomes. 
Problem 6 allowed Angela to demonstrate that she recognized when the sample space 
changed and when it did not change. 
I: 	 Problem 6b: You rolled the die and got a 2. Roll the die again. 
Does the outcome ofthe first roll affect the possibility of  rolling a 
2 the second time? 
S: 	 This one, no.  There is a 1 to 6 probability that urn, that you roll a 
2.  And there is still 1 to 6 that you are going to roll the 2 again. 
I: 	 So, they are the same? 
S: 	 Yea. 
I: 	 Then, how come on Problem 4, when we are choosing Snicker, 
Hershey and Butterfinger bars, when you first reach into the bag, 
you said the probability of  getting a Snickers is 4 to 9.  But when 
you reached in for the second time, you said the probability of 
getting a Snickers bar is 4 to 8.  How come the probability 
changed for that problem, but not for this one? 
S: 	 Because there is still, they did not take away the 2 on the die.  So, 
it is equal. .. Because I know they are still the same.  The 
probability of  getting a 2 again. 
Angela was more satisfied with her responses on the second administration ofthe 
Inventory.  Angela recognized the question of  interest, a difficulty she overcame from the 89 
first interview, and solved the problem accordingly.  Despite her continued difficulty 
identifying the sample space in Problems 2 and 3, the remaining problems indicated that 
Angela recognized when they did and did not change.  By recognizing that the sample 
space did change, Angela identified in the second interview that the probability also 
changed; a weakness Angela encountered during the first interview.  In solving her 
problems during the second interview, Angela approached the solution with two different 
methods: probability and ratios, but was not able to explain why she would use one 
method over the other.  Angela's approach changed from the first interview when she 
chose to state her solutions using ratios or proportions. 
Beth 
After serving in the National Guard for 16 years, Beth returned to college to 
complete her degree in sociology and criminal justice.  Beth, a senior, had completed two 
junior level statistics courses at the university prior to enrolling in this course.  She claims 
her mathematical background was not strong, and that she had only completed pre­
college algebra courses.  When asked which probability concepts she recalled from her 
prior classes, Beth said that her first formal introduction to probability was in her 
previous statistics course, and she was hesitant to try to list some ofthe terminology and 
concepts covered in the class. 
Beth's solutions and explanations to the problems on the Probability Knowledge 
Inventory indicated that Beth had difficulties explaining her solutions using probability 
terminology.  For example, when answering Problem 1, Beth believed that the possible 
color that could be chosen from the bag was green, because "there is more probability in 90 
green".  Her main confusion in probability terminology also stemmed from her confusion 
between probability and odds.  For Problem 4b Beth would interchange terminology 
associated with odds and probability: 
I:  Problem 4b: Suppose you chose a Hershey Bar and ate it.  If  you 
reached into the bag again, what kind ofcandy bar do you have 
the most chance of  drawing? 
S:  The Snickers bar, because there is still more Snickers.  There is 
four Snickers.  Well, I guess it will be an even chance of 
drawing, because the chance ofdrawing ofthe other two, there is 
four Snickers and four ofthe other two kind.  There are two 
Hershey and two Butterfingers.  Four out of  four.  The chance of 
still drawing, I would say is a Snickers bar, because, there are 
more ofthem.  Your odds are better. 
Beth's continued confusion between the terminology associated with odds and probability 
was evident in the methods she used to approach solving three ofthe problems, thus 
indicating a confusion between the concepts ofprobability and odds.  For Problems 4 and 
5, Beth used odds to solve the problems and state the solution.  However, in Problem 6, 
Beth converted to solving the problems using probability, with the concept of  odds used 
sparingly.  When trying to clarify why she used the two different methods for solving the 
problems, Beth was confused: 
I: 	 Problem 6a: Is it more likely that the class president will be a 
boy or a girl? 
S: 	 A boy, because there are more ofthem. 
I: 	 Is it more likely that Rick will be chosen or Rick will not be 
chosen? 
S: 	 Well, he has a 1 to 5 chance over everyone else, but he is 1 in 3 
with the boys, because there are 3 boys. 
I: 	 You wrote that "he has a 1 / 5 chance but his odds are better than 
the girls".  What do you mean that the odds are better than the 
girls? 
S: 	 There are 3 boys and 2 girls. 
I: 	 So Rick's odds are ... 91 
S:  1 in 3 
I:  And what does the 3 represent? 
S:  The 3 boys. 
I:  In your answer you wrote, what does the 5 represent? 
S:  Well, that will be everyone.  Be he really had ... Well, he has the 
same chance as any, realistically, but it should be a 1 in 5 
chance.  But his odds are better than the girls. 
I:  So, Rick was 1 and 5 was the total ofeveryone.  Let's look at the 
previous problems.  In Problem 4, we had 4 Snickers Bars, and 
there were 5 remaining Hershey and Butterfinger bars.  Whereas 
in this problem ... 
S:  So, 1 in 4 would probably be better than ...  (hesitation of 
completing sentence) 
I:  I was just wondering which one would sound more reasonable to 
you: the 1 student out ofthe total number ofstudents, or the 4 
Hershey bars to the remaining 5 candy bars. 
S:  Urn... I see what I was doing here, I was counting up these and 
separating them.  I was not doing that over here.  Because those 
are different items and those were just people.  Granted, they are 
boys and girls, and I did separate them by gender, but they are 
not Snickers. 
A second difficulty Beth had when solving the problems was the ability to 
recognize the sample space for most ofthe problems, especially when a condition was on 
the original event.  For Problem 3, when Beth had to list all the possible combinations of 
coloring three sections with three different colored pencils, Beth first felt comfortable 
suggesting there are only three possible combinations.  When asked about a combination 
she did not list, she saw that she was missing some combinations.  Frustrated at the 
problem, she concluded there were only nine possible combinations for a three by three 
matrix, but did not want to list them all.  Beth's frustration with recognizing the sample 
space also carried into her solutions of  the conditional probability questions.  Beth 
recognized that the sample space did change when a candy bar was eaten, or a marble 
was taken away, but had difficulties assigning quantifiable statements to her solutions 
once the sample space changed.  For the final problem, Problem 6, Beth did recognize 92 
that after rolling a 2, the probability of  rolling another 2 did not change, and the sample 
space did not change from one event to the next. 
With the difficulty in recognizing the complete sample space and the confusion 
between probability and odds, Beth was still able to rationalize the correct solutions to 
the probability questions.  She felt confident of  her solutions, appearing to use her 
intuition more than quantifiable methods.  Unfortunately, when Beth tried conditional 
problems, her main struggles were computing the size ofthe new sample space, and not 
being confused with the problem.  Overall, Beth used a variety ofproblem solving 
techniques to find solutions - intuition, odds, probability - without using one method 
more frequently than the other. 
Beth was a bit hesitant during her second interview.  She was behind on some 
homework and was very tired.  Her current state ofmind may have influenced her 
responses to the questions, but Beth seemed to try hard to answer the questions. 
Beth approached most ofthe problems on the second administration ofthe 
Probability Knowledge Inventory through rationalizing the problem and hoping her 
solution was correct.  Her attempt to rationalize the solutions was more apparent in the 
second interview than the first.  Her main problem solving approaches in the second 
interview consisted ofrationalizing and using ratios sporadically.  For instance, she 
recognized in Problem 4b that there were 4 Snicker bars to 4 other candy bars, and in 
Problem 6c there were "I girl to 3 boys", but for Problem 5a, Beth selected blue because 
"there are more blue marbles in the bag than the other marbles".  Beth appeared to use the 
ratios to derive her solutions, but did not use the ratios to answer the questions. 93 
However, her limited use ofratios and rationalizing the solution did confuse her on 
responding to one problem: 
I:  Problem 5b: Suppose you are assigned a green and your friend is 
assigned a yellow marble. Your teacher reached in and drew a 
marble.  Which ofthe four colors do you predict will be drawn? 
S:  I am betting on blue, but it would be nice ifit was green. 
I:  Why are you saying blue? 
S:  Because there are more ofthem. 
S:  Why would you like it to be green? 
I:  Because I don't want to take the test. 
S:  On the Inventory you wrote, "Really this is a 50/50 chance, but I 
don't want to take the test".  What do you mean by 50/50 
chance? 
I:  Well, both me and my friend have an even chance ofhaving a 
marble picked. 
S:  So you and your friend have an even chance of  getting your 
marble picked? 
I:  Well, no, not really.  The yellow one has less ofa chance than I 
do. 
S:  How do you know that? 
I:  Because there is only one marble. 
This interaction also indicates that Beth had difficulty recognizing the sample space of 
the problem and the outcomes ofthe event.  She tried to use humor to explain her answer, 
but appeared to confuse herself more.  When asked why she preferred to solve some 
problems with numerical values, and others through reasoning, Beth replied "I don't 
know".  In addition, when asked if  she preferred to reason out the solution or use 
numerical values, Beth replied, "It doesn't make any difference". 
Beth's previous difficulty with recognizing the sample space was also evident in 
another problem when she had to compare simple probabilities.  For Problem 6b, Beth 
forgot to include the girls in her sample: 94 
I:  Problem 6b: Is it more likely that Rick will be chosen or Rick 
will not be chosen? 
S:  Rick has just as much of  a chance as the other 3 boys. But yea, 
he could be chosen. 
Her difficulty with recognizing the sample space continued with the problems concerning 
conditional probability.  Beth recognized that the original sample space changed, but is 
unsure how to explain the change: 
I:  Problem 5c: Your teacher chose a blue marble and did not 
replace it.  Suppose your teacher has another drawing the 
following day.  Has your chance ofwinning the second day 
changed or is it the same as the day before? 
S:  It's changed. 
I:  How do you know it has changed? 
S:  Because there is one less marble. 
I:  Has your friend's chance changed, or is it the same as the day 
before? 
S:  It has changed. There is one less marble. 
I:  What do you mean by "there is one less marble"? 
S:  The blue marble is gone, so that is one less marble. 
During the second administration ofthe Inventory, Beth seemed to not have a 
preferred method for approaching the solutions.  When trying to solve the problems, Beth 
used a combination of  both rationalization and ratios.  In the previous administration of 
the Inventory, Beth used a variety ofproblem solving techniques to find the solution-
intuition, odds, probability- without using one method more frequently than the other. 
Beth's main difficulty continued to be recognizing the correct sample space, thus making 
her feel unsure with her explanations ofthe solutions.  Without a solid understanding of 
sample space, Beth was not able to clearly describe the conditional events and what had 
occurred in these problems.  The apparent difficulties in recognizing the complete sample 95 
space and computing the size ofthe new sample space Beth had on the first 
administration ofthe Inventory continued with her second attempt of  solving problems on 
the Inventory. 
Cathy 
Cathy enrolled in the course with a strong background in mathematics and 
probability.  In high school, Cathy had taken a functions, statistics, and trigonometry 
course introducing her to the basic concepts ofprobability.  Prior to enrolling in this 
course, Cathy completed both a sophomore level statistics course and college algebra 
course. Cathy was a 19-year-old sophomore, majoring in Housing Studies, and enrolled 
in the course because she needed three more credits during the spring term. 
After a review ofCathy's solutions and the interview, it was evident that Cathy 
was proficient in solving problems requiring probability and conditional probability. 
Without prompting, Cathy was able to systematically explain how she reached her 
conclusions, and to compare her solutions.  Her scratchwork on the Inventory indicated 
that Cathy had also devised her own system for attacking probability questions.  Cathy 
was proficient at providing quantifiable solutions, and she used correct terminology in 
answering the questions.  Cathy's response to Problem 5c illustrates her thought 
processes: 
I:  Problem 5c: Your teacher chose a blue marble, and did not 
replace it.  Suppose your teacher has another drawing the 
following day.  Has your chance of  winning the second day 
changed, or is it the same as the day before?  Has your friend's 
chance of  winning changed, or is it the same as before? 
S:  Well, since she only drew a blue marble, and I was assigned a 96 
green marble, my chances have changed from 3 in 10; to 3 in 9. 
And then my friend, since his marble wasn't chosen either, which 
was yellow, which was 1 in 10, since he did not replace the 
marble, it is 1 in 9 chance now.  And it changed because the 
entire number ofmarbles in the bag decreased. 
Cathy expressed the solutions to all the problems using probability, and was able 
to use the correct probability terminology in solving her problems.  She did not have 
difficulties understanding the problem, and seemed to enjoy the challenge. 
Cathy enjoyed the class on probability, and stated that it helped clarify some of 
the questions she had about probability.  Cathy underlined key words on each ofthe 
problems on the Probability Knowledge Inventory and explained that the underlining of 
key words helped her approach the problems.  Cathy was confident in her solutions and 
was able to explain her reasoning behind her solutions.  On the conditional probability 
problems, Cathy recognized the change in sample space and adjusted her solutions 
accordingly: 
I:  Problem 5c: Your teacher chose a blue marble, and did not 
replace it.  Suppose your teacher has another drawing the 
following day.  Has your chance of  winning the second day 
changed, or is it the same as the day before? 
S:  Well, since I have the blue marble, there was 3 ofthem. And 
originally it was 3 out of 10, because there was 10 marbles. 
Since she drew one blue marble and did not replace it, my 
chance is now 3 out of9. 
I:  Did your friend's chance ofwinning change? 
S:  Yes it did.  It went from lout of 10 to lout of9. 
Cathy also recognized when the sample space and the probability did not change: 
I: 	 You rolled the die and got a 2. Roll the die again.  Does the 
outcome ofthe first roll affect the possibility ofrolling a 2 the 
second time? 97 
S:  No, because the die doesn't care what you rolled before. It will 
still come up randomly, whatever it comes up. 
I:  In Problem 4, when you had candy bars, 4 Snickers, 3 Hershey, 
and 2 Butterfingers, at the first drawing you said Snickers had 
the best chance ofbeing selected with a 4 to 9 chance.  When 
you had the second drawing, you said the Snickers bar had 4 to 
8.  How come when you rolled the die the second time ... 
S:  There is always going to be 6 numbers that can come up. And 
there is only one ofeach number. 
I:  So, why does the probability change with the Snickers bar. 
S:  It changed because it originated with 9 bars in the bag, and after 
one was eaten, there was only 8 left. 
Cathy did not appear to have difficulties in listing the sample space, determining 
the sample space, and justifying her solutions using probability.  Cathy recognized the 
change in sample space and the change in probability ofthe problems containing 
conditional probability.  For all of  the problems, Cathy chose to use probability to justify 
her solutions.  It was evident that Cathy was proficient solving problems requiring 
probability and conditional probability at level ofthe course. 
Debra 
Debra was an 18-year-old freshman majoring in communications.  Debra was 
apprehensive about taking the math class because she thought her mathematics skills 
were not strong enough.  The year before, she had completed an intermediate algebra 
course in high school.  Hoping to gain more mathematics skills to give her the necessary 
background to the required for her degree, she enrolled the previous summer in a basic 
mathematics course.  Debra continued building up her mathematics knowledge her 
freshman year by enrolling in another basic mathematics course and a pre-college algebra 
course. She recalls learning probability in high school, but could not recall any ofthe 98 
topics covered.  Debra had had the instructor for this course for her basic mathematics 
course in the fall term. 
Reading the responses on the Probability Knowledge Inventory and during the 
interview, Debra seemed to prefer to rationalize the solutions to the problems without 
using numbers to further justify her solutions.  Her rationalization did take in 
consideration the change ofthe sample space during the conditional probability problems, 
and she was able to derive the correct solution.  In response to Problem 5: 
I:  Suppose your teacher is going to have a drawing to see who can 
miss the final exam without it affecting their grade.  If  your color 
is drawn, then you do not have to take the final exam.  In a bag, 
there are 4 blue marbles, 3 green marbles, 2 red marbles, and 1 
yellow marble.  What color would you like to be? 
S:  Blue, because, there is, yes, there's more ofthe different colors, 
but they are all broken up into smaller groups and blue you got 
the most, out ofall ofthem. And so, that is why I chose that one. 
I:  Suppose you are assigned green, and your friend is assigned 
yellow.  Your teacher reached in and drew a marble.  Which of 
the four colors will you predict will be drawn? 
S:  Blue, isn't it kind oflike the same as this question? (pointing to 
part a) 
I:  Yes, it is. 
S:  OK, blue, for the same reason. 
I:  Your teacher chose a blue marble, and did not replace it. 
Suppose your teacher has another drawing the following day. 
Has your chance ofwinning the second day changed or is it the 
same as the day before? 
S:  Yea, it's like the Snickers one, because you took out one ofthe 
higher, like the one who had the most chance, and now it's like 
even with the green, and so like you have the same chance of 
getting blue and green because they both have three in there. So, 
it's changed now.  Because now, I have a better chance of 
getting it, the marble. 
The only time Debra used a quantitative answer to support her original solutions 
was her response to Problem 4b.  For Problem 4b, Debra did notice that the chance of 99 
getting a Snickers bar became 50%, after the Hershey bar was removed from the bag. 
After explaining how she derived the 50%, Debra was then asked to return to Problems 5 
and 6 and asked if  she could also give a numerical solution to each problem. With some 
hesitation, Debra successfully found corresponding numerical solutions using fractions 
and percentages, even recognizing the change ofthe sample space. 
Despite her ability to rationalize the solutions to Problems 4 and 5, Debra did not 
know how to start solving Problem 6: 
I:  The ASOSU is electing a president and a vice president. There 
are five people running: Beth, Jose, Maria, Rick, and Joshua.  All 
five students are considered to have an equal chance ofwinning. 
At the end ofthe day, the results are announced. 
Is it more likely that the class president will be a boy or a girl, 
and why? 
S:  Since it is all, like, equal, so, I wasn't sure, I mean I did not know 
any way to pick it or if  it was random or I did not know how to 
work this one. 
I:  So, let's look at the second one: Is it more likely that Rick will be 
chosen or Rick will not be chosen? 
S:  Well, again, since it was equal, I did not know how to solve that. 
I:  Could you use some ofthe reasoning that you used on the other 
problems? For instance, using numbers and setting up fractions. 
S:  But, there is like, not a number, like one out of  five, or like, I 
mean, there is no specific number given to them. 
Her frustration with equally likely outcomes also appeared in her solution to Problem 7: 
I 	 You have a die.  If  you rolled the die, can you predict with 
certainty which number will come up? 
S: 	 No, because it is random, equal, equal chance because the 
numbers on the die show up once. 
I: 	 You rolled the die and got a 2.  Roll the die again. Does the 
outcome ofthe first roll affecting the possibility of  rolling a 2 
the second time? 
S: 	 No, unless you roll it the exact same way, with the exact same 
... everything.  But now, because the numbers only show up 
once. 100 
I:  How come on these questions, when you took out a Hershey 
bar, or taking out a marble ... 
S:  Because there was not an equal number of, there wasn't like, if 
there was one Snicker, or one Hershey, or one Butterfinger 
bar, then it would be like the same (problem).  That would be 
saying like this ... the number 4 written on the dice, 4 times 
and then the 2 written on it twice. 
I:  Suppose you wanted to roll a 3.  On average, how many rolls 
should it take to ensure that a 3 would come up? 
S:  I have no idea.  Because there, I do not know how to solve 
that.  Like I said earlier, they are all equal.  You can't like say, 
there is going to be an average, because there is not.  Unless 
you roll it the exact same way. 
During the first administration ofthe Probability Knowledge Inventory, Debra 
seemed to prefer providing a reason behind her solutions without numerical justification; 
however, when asked for a numerical response, she was just as capable and would use 
fractions and percentages in her responses.  Debra was able to recognize when a 
condition changed the sample space, and her rationalization changed accordingly.  Her 
main difficulty was recognizing the properties ofequally likely events and how to 
compare the events. 
When Debra arrived for the second interview, she claimed she was able to recall 
how she developed the solutions on the initial Probability Knowledge Inventory.  Debra 
believed she solved the problems on the second administration ofthe Inventory using the 
same methods.  On the second test, Debra wrote out the answers to the problems, without 
providing elaborate justification.  Some ofher written responses included "Snickers, 
because it is in the bag the most", "Blue, there are more", or "Boy, there is more". 
During the interview, Debra would start explaining her solution using quantities on the 
simple probability problems, but when a condition was added to the problem, she would 
start rationalizing her response without using quantitative support.  This approach to 101 
solving the problems was similar to her first attempt.  Sometimes Debra appeared to not 
understand how to respond and would use her own terminology to explain the problem: 
I:  Problem 4: In a bag you have 4 Snicker bars, 3 Hershey Bars, 
and 2 Butterfinger Bars.  Suppose you closed your eyes and 
drew a candy bar. What kind ofcandy bar do you have the most 
chance ofdrawing and why? 
S:  Snickers bar, because it is the most in there. 
I:  Suppose you chose a Hershey Bar and ate it.  If  you reached into 
the bag again, what kind ofcandy bar do you have the most 
chance ofdrawing? And why? 
S:  Urn, now you have an even better chance ofgetting the Snickers 
because you are minus 1 ofthe others, you have less ofthose, 
and greater the Snickers. 
I:  What do you mean by "greater the Snickers"? 
S:  Well, it already .... OK, there are already more Snickers in there, 
and then, urn, if  you ... and there are less ofthe other kind, and if 
you took out one more ofthe other kind, you have greater the 
chance of, a more better chance ofgetting a Snickers, because 
now it is like, like ... you had 3 ofthe Hershey bars, now you 
have 2 Hershey bars, basically you have double the Snickers, 
double the other, hence a greater ... do you get what I am saying? 
I:  Has your chance ofdrawing a Snickers Bar in part (b) changed 
or is it the same chance as in part (a)? 
S:  Just like I said before, you have a greater chance because there is 
one less ofthe others, so basically, you have ... I mean  ... less of 
the other kind, and more ofthe Snickers, you are going to get ... 
like ...  destiny, or like it's fate that you are going to get the other 
kind. There is more. 
But when Debra was asked to compare two different problems that were affected by a 
condition, she tried to use probability to justify her responses, but reverted back to 
rationalization when stating her final response.  At the end, Debra used her intuition to 
solve the problem, but gave the solution she thought was being sought: 102 
I:  Problem 5c: Your teacher chose a blue marble, and did not 
replace it. Suppose your teacher has another drawing the 
following day. Has your chance of  winning the second day 
changed or is it the same as the day before? 
S:  It changed.  Because now the one that was the most is not  ... and 
you basically ... it's either, but, I mean, since blue and green are 
the highest, it is fair game for that one. Most likely, these two will 
be less chosen (pointing to red and yellow). But now you have a 
better chance, because blue is not ahead ofyou. Blue is not more. 
I:  Has your friend's chance of  winning changed? 
S:  No, not really, because it is still lout of... I mean, I guess ... I 
know  ... not really ... I don't think so. 
I:  So, it has not changed? 
S:  I mean  ... yea, it has changed because there is 1 less ofthe other 
color, but still it is the only 1 in there. Majority rules, and it 
probability will not.  Basically your friend has lout ofhow many 
there are. lout of  9 chances, because there are 9 marbles, oh, 
wait  ... there is lout of9 marbles. lout ofthe 9, she is lout of 
them. And green is 3 out ofthe 9. 
I:  Returning to the original question has your friend's chance 
changed? 
S:  Urn, I guess, I mean, I don't know, I don't think so, personally, 
but if  you want to go the probability of  it, yea, because it is not 1 
out of 10 anymore. It is lout of  9. 
I:  Where are you getting lout of 10 and lout of9? 
S:  Because there was ... there was 10 marbles, but your teacher took 
one away.  Now there is 9. So, yes, it has gotten better, I think. 
I:  So, going back to the first question has your chance changed? 
S  :  Yea, because, there's not ... there is not more of  one color than 
me. Like green is the highest, more ofthe color, more ofthe 
green in there.  First it was more blue, but now there is the same 
amount of  green and blue. 
Debra preferred to rationalize here solutions to Problems 4 and 5, whether it was to state 
the solution to a simple probability or a conditional probability.  When the conditioning 
event occurred to the problem, Debra was able to recognize the change in the sample 
space, and based her results on the fact there was a smaller sample space: 103 
I:  Suppose you chose a Hershey Bar and ate it.  If  you reached into 
the bag again, what kind ofcandy bar do you have the most 
chance ofdrawing? And why? 
S:  Urn, now you have an even better chance of  getting the Snickers 
because you are minus 1 ofthe others, you have less of  those, and 
greater the Snickers. 
I:  What do you mean by "greater the Snickers"? 
S:  Well, it already .... OK, there are already more Snickers in there, 
and then, urn, ifyou... and there are less ofthe other kind, and if 
you took out one more ofthe other kind, you have greater the 
chance of, a more better chance of  getting a Snickers, because 
now it is like, like ... you had 3 ofthe Hershey bars, now you 
have 2 Hershey bars, basically you have double the Snickers, 
double the other, hence a greater ... do you get what I am saying? 
I:  Has your chance ofdrawing a Snickers Bar in part (b) changed or 
is it the same chance as in part (a)? 
S:  Just like I said before, you have a greater chance because there is 
one less ofthe others, so basically, you have  ... I mean  ... less of 
the other kind, and more ofthe Snickers, you are going to get ... 
like ...  destiny, or like it's fate that you are going to get the other 
kind. There is more. 
This was the same technique used by Debra on the previous administration ofthe 
Inventory. 
On the first test, Debra did not know how to solve Problem 6.  However, on her 
second test, Debra appeared to understand the problem and used ratios to explain the 
solution.  Since this was her first attempt to use a quantifiable solution to her problems, 
Debra was asked why she did not use ratios in a similar problem; Debra was surprised at 
the question, and tried to use ratios.  After that, Debra did not try to use ratios to explain a 
problem: 
I: 	 Problem 6c: Suppose Beth is selected president.  A vice president 
is selected randomly from the remaining candidates.  Is it more 
likely the vice president will be a boy or a girl? 
S: 	 Guy, because if  you just drew out of  the bag, the ratio is 3 guys to 
1 girl. And so, it is more likely you are going to get the guy.  Just 104 
like the whole marbles thing.  Like if  there is more blue than 
green, you will more likely get the blue because there is more in 
there. 
I:  And, how come you did not answer the first one (Problem 6a) 
with the ratio since we were also looking at if  it would be more 
likely that it was a boy or a girl? 
S:  Want me to? 
I:  Sure. What would the ratio be? 
S:  It would be 3 boys to 2 girls. 
It  was not apparent that Debra had difficulties understanding the problems or 
rationalizing the solutions.  This was a similar approach to solving the problems during 
the first administration ofthe Inventory.  Debra admitted that it was difficult for her to 
justify the correct solution, but believed all her solutions were correct.  Debra was able to 
recognize the change in sample space, but did not use the numerical quantities to help 
solve a problem.  However, Debra was able to recognize when the sample space did 
change and when it did not. 
I: 	 Problem 6b: You rolled the die and got a 2.  Roll the die again. 
Does the outcome ofthe first roll affect the possibility of  rolling a 
2 the second time? 
S: 	 No, it is the same answer as last time. Unless you roll it the same 
exact way, everything the same, no. 
I: 	 So, how about with the candy bar problem, I asked what is the 
chance of  getting the Snickers bar, you were saying that it 
changed from the first drawing to the second drawing. 
S: 	 Because there is a different amount ofnumbers on there. This is 
all on there equally. The Snickers, there was 3 ofthat, 3 ofthe 
Hershey, but 2 ofthe Butterfingers. So it is not all equal. 
I: 	 But you were saying the chance was different for the candy bar 
problem, and for the die, you are saying it is the same. 
S: 	 Because these are all on here (the die) equally.  These are all 
equal. 
Debra preferred to rationalize her solutions, taking into account possible changes in 
sample space.  If  she appeared to be unable to explain a solution, Debra reverted to 105 
explaining the solution using probability or ratios.  However, her final solution was 
always a rational statement.  Debra did not appear to have difficulty understanding the 
question, or recognizing a conditioning statement. It is evident that Debra understood 
basic probability and conditional probability questions.  Her methods of  solving the 
problems on the second administration ofthe Inventory did not appear to change from the 
first administration; however, Debra was able to provide a solution to Problem 6 during 
the second interview. 
Emily 
Despite being older than the average student and having difficulties returning to 
school, Emily, at age 42, was determined to pass all her required mathematics courses for 
her degree in Housing Studies.  Emily was glad this course was her final class after 
struggling through eight terms ofbasic arithmetic and pre-algebra at the local community 
college; however, she was excited to have passed college algebra the previous term.  She 
did not recall having a course covering the concepts ofprobability, and she was looking 
forward to learning a new topic that did not involve algebra. 
Emily approached the problems on the first administration ofthe Probability 
Knowledge Inventory using her intuition and rationalizing the possible solutions.  Despite 
a lack of  formal instruction in probability, Emily was able to rationalize the correct 
solutions to all the problems, using her own terminology to explain her solutions. 
I: 	 Problem 4: In a bag, there are 4 Snickers bars, 3 Hershey bars, 
and 2 Butterfinger bars.  Suppose you closed your eyes and drew 
a candy bar.  What kind ofcandy bar do you have the most 
chance ofdrawing and why? 106 
S:  You have the most chance of  drawing a Snickers bar because 
there are more Snickers than any ofthe other ...  bars. 
I:  Suppose you chose a Hershey bar and ate it.  If  you reached into 
the bag again, what kind of  candy bar do you have the most 
chance of  drawing? 
S:  You still have the best chance of  drawing a Snickers because 
you, urn, eaten one ofthe others, so you lowered that nurnber, so 
you raised the chances of  Snickers. 
I:  Has your chance of  drawing a Snickers bar in part (b) changed 
or is it the same chance as in part (a)? 
S:  Chance (b) has increased, because you have, urn, you deleted 
one ofthe other bars, so you are getting more of  chance, one 
more of  a chance to get the Snickers than you are in the first one. 
I:  Can you define for me "one more chance"? 
S:  Well, here you have 7 options, no, wait, 9 options in (a) and 4 of 
those are going to be a Snickers.  So you have already eaten a 
Hershey's, so that gives you 4,5, 7, 8, ...  8 options, but still, you 
still have 4 Snickers, so your chances are 50% of  getting a 
Snickers in part (b). 
Emily rationalized the solution to Problem 5 in a similar manner using more ofher own 
terminology: 
I: 	 Problem 5: Suppose your teacher is going to have a drawing to 
see who can miss the final exam without it affecting their grade. 
If  you color is drawn, then you do not have to take the final exam. 
In a bag, there are 4 blue marbles, 3 green marbles, 2 red marbles, 
and 1 yellow marble.  What color do you want to be? And why 
S: 	 This one confused me a little, but I thought my reasoning was the 
same as the other one.  I thought the blue, because there was more 
blue marbles than it had of  another color. 
I: 	 Suppose you are assigned green and your friend is assigned 
yellow.  Your teacher reached in and drew a marble.  Which of 
the four colors do you predict will be drawn? 
S: 	 I will still predict blue, because there are still more blue marbles 
than any ofthe other colors. 
I: 	 And then your teacher chose a blue marble, and did not replace it. 
Suppose your teacher has another drawing the following day. Has 
your chance ofwinning the second day change, or is it the same 
as the day before? 
S: 	 Yes, it is better than yesterday, because one ofthe blue marbles is 
missing so now there is only three. Three blue and three green. 
So, green has a 50% chance of ...  getting over the blue. 107 
I:  How are you getting 50%? 
S:  So, she took a blue one out, now there is 3 blue and 3 green, and 
2 red, and 1 yellow.  Ok, so it is not a 50% chance ...  There is 
going to be the same amount ofblue and green marbles now, so if 
I have a green one, and my friend has a yellow one, 
I:  So, has your chance different today than it was yesterday? 
S:  Yes, because there is one less blue marble, and I had green. 
I:  And then has your friend's chance ofwinning changed, or is it the 
same as before? 
S:  Her chances are better, one better too, because there is one less 
blue. 
I:  How are you defining "one better"? 
S:  One more, one more opportunity to win.  One more ...  what is the 
word I am looking for. .. a greater chance, a greater chance. 
In her rationalization, Emily did try to assign quantifiable solutions to support her 
answer.  Whenever Emily noticed that there was a 50% chance of  either getting the 
Snickers bar or the blue marble, she reported the solution with the percentage.  However, 
after explaining her rationalization to her solutions, she was asked if  she could use 
percentages to solve the Problem 6.  Emily tried, but with some hesitation: 
I: 	 In Problem 4, towards the end, you started assigning percentages 
to your solutions.  For example, in part (b) you said there was a 
50% chance of  choosing a Snickers bar after the Hershey bar was 
eaten. For Problem 5, is there a way you can assign percentages 
to the three questions? 
S: 	 Urn, I am not good with percentages ...  there are more blue, Well, 
if  you add the 3 green, and the 2 red and the 1 yellow, we have 5 
chances there, no you have 6 chances, so you have 6 chances with 
the other colors, and 4 chances with the color blue. So you would 
not quite have 50% chance, that would be around 30%. 
I: 	 So, if  you do not quite have 50% how come you still chose blue? 
S: 	 Urn ... because there is still more blue marbles, you still have a 
good chance of  getting a blue. 
After rationalizing the solutions to Problems 4 and 5, and assigning percentages, 
whenever she felt comfortable, Emily proceeded to solve Problem 6 using ratios and 108 
probability.  Emily noticed Problem 6 was comparing 3 boys to 2 girls, and the chance of 
Rick being chosen for the first election was that "Rick has a 1 in 5 chances of  winning", 
and "4 chances out of  5, that he will not be chosen".  Emily easily recognized in Problem 
6 that the sample space did reduce to four after Beth was selected president, and 
continued solving the problem using proportions with the correct terminology. 
During the first administration ofthe Probability Knowledge Inventory, Emily 
approached most ofthe problems by rationalizing the solutions and using her own 
terminology to explain her solutions.  When using quantifiable justifications to her 
solutions, Emily was not consistent in her use ofpercentages, ratios, and probability. 
Overall, Emily was able to solve the problems correctly, recognizing the change in 
sample space in the conditioning event, and able to recognize independent events. 
Emily arrived at the second interview in good spirits, and was excited to answer 
the questions. She felt that she has learned so much about probability, and was confident 
she understood the problems better and solved them in "less than half  the time it took me 
to understand them last time".  Still nervous about the interview, Emily held a pencil in 
her hand, which she then realized was a great tool for her to write down her thoughts 
during the interview. 
At the first glance ofEmily's written solutions on the Inventory, it appeared that 
Emily used probability to state her solutions, unlike in her previous attempt when Emily 
rationalized her solutions.  However, as Emily explained her solutions to the problems, 
she stated her solutions without the probability to support it.  Through her explanations, 
Emily was able to recognize the sample space, the change in sample space, and 
comparison ofprobabilities.  When questioned about the probabilities stated on the 109 
Inventory, Emily was able to support her rational response with the probabilities she 
originally wrote on the Inventory. 
I:  Problem 4c: Suppose you chose a Hershey bar and ate it. If  you 
reached into the bag again, what kind of  candy bar do you have 
the most chance of  winning? 
S:  Oh, I chose a Hershey Bar and ate it.  Ok, so now there is two 
Hershey Bars.  OK.  So, it's Snickers!  You still have a chance 
with Snickers because there is less Hershey bars, now. So you 
have a better chance of  getting a Snickers now.  Because you 
lowered the number of  Hershey bars. 
I:  On the side ofthe problem, you wrote 4/8.  What does that 
mean? 
S:  That means 4 possibilities out of  8 total. 
I:  Problem 4c: Has your chance of  drawing a Snickers bar in part 
(b) changed or is it the same chance as in part (a)? 
S:  Chances increased from part (a) because a Hershey was taken 
out and not replaced.  So the possibility is now 4 out of  8 
chances there will be a Snickers. 
I:  I have a question.  On the margin you wrote 4 out of  9 and 4 out 
of  8; did you write that when you did (a) and (b) or did you 
write them when you were doing part (c)? 
S:  I did that when I was doing (a) and (b). 
Emily explained Problems 4, 5, 6, and 7 using probabilities, first replying her rationale 
behind the solution, then returning back to her written probability solution for further 
explanation. 
Despite Emily's ability to rationalize the problems and support her solutions with 
probability, Emily did have problems interpreting the problem and sporadically answer a 
different problem.  It was not clear if  Emily did not read the problems correctly, or if  she 
was having difficulty with the problem.  While solving Problem 4, Emily thought the 
Snickers bar was removed, not the Hershey bar.  During the interview, she was able to 
catch her misunderstanding on this problem and corrected her solution accordingly. 
However, in Problem 5, Emily did not answer the question of  interest, nor did she 110 
recognize during the interview that she originally did not answer the question ofinterest 
and change it, as in the previous problem. 
I:  Problem 5c: Your teacher drew a blue marble, and did not 
replace it.  Suppose your teacher has another drawing the 
following day.  Has your chance ofwinning the second day 
change, or is it the same as the day before? 
S:  Yes, my chance has changed because now, there is a blue marble 
missing.  Which brings that down to 3 blue marbles I believe. 
The chances are the same for the blue or green. Because there 
are 3 blue and 3 green. 
I:  So, the 3 out of9, what does the 3 represent? 
S:  The 3 represents 3 blue marbles, out of9 possibilities.  And also 
3 green marbles out of  9 possibilities. 
Emily was not able to answer the question "Has your chance ofwinning the second day 
changed, or is it the same as the day before".  Instead, Emily continued to compare 
probabilities ofother colors.  Emily's perpetual habit ofnot solving for the question of 
interest even appeared in Problem 6.  Whenever asked about Rick's chance of  winning, 
Emily would refer to the chance of  boys winning overall, not Rick individually. 
Emily showed that during the second interview, she appeared to solve the 
problems both rationally, and with support ofprobability.  Previously, Emily appeared to 
rationalize the solutions.  During the second interview, Emily had a tendency to verbally 
state her solutions without numerical support; however, would write her solutions using 
probability.  While solving the problems, Emily recognized the probabilities of  various 
events, taking into account the changes in sample space, and felt comfortable comparing 
probabilities.  Despite Emily's ability to solve the problems rationally, supporting the 
solutions with probability, Emily's main problem was recognizing the question of  interest 
and solving accordingly. III 
Response to Research Questions 
The previous section ofthis chapter met the first objective: to portray the five 
participants prior to and after instruction.  The portraits included a description ofthe 
heuristics and difficulties they encountered while trying to solve probability and 
conditional probability problems.  The objective ofthe final section of  this chapter is to 
address the three research questions of  this study. 
Question One: What are some ofthe heuristics college students use, and what are 
some ofthe difficulties they encounter solving conditional probability problems 
prior to receiving instruction on sample space, probability ofan event, and 
conditional probability? 
Data from the five participants administration ofthe Probability Knowledge 
Inventory and the interviews prior to instruction indicate an assortment ofheuristics that 
the students used and a greater variety ofdifficulties the students encountered while 
solving conditional probability problems. 
Heuristics 
Among these five participants, rationalization, finding the odds, computing the 
percentages, and stating the ratio of  a problem were the preferred heuristics used to solve 
the problems on the Probability Knowledge Inventory.  Emily and Debra relied entirely 
on rationalization and some intuition to solve the problems, while Beth used 
rationalization combined with computation ofodds.  Ofthese three students, only Debra 
and Beth had prior instruction on probability.  When asked to apply numerical reasoning 112 
to their solutions, Emily and Debra preferred percentages, while Beth preferred finding 
the odds.  Angela and Cathy, the two students who had the most previous exposure to 
probability before the course, felt more comfortable using ratios and probability to solve 
their problems.  Angela had difficulty understanding the word problems, treating 
probability as another algorithm to solve word problems, while Cathy was proficient and 
systematic in her solutions to the problems. 
Difficulties 
The students encountered some difficulties while attempting to solve the 
conditional probability problems.  Angela and Debra appeared to have difficulties 
understanding the questions.  While Angela claimed it was her dislike ofword problems 
overall that caused difficulty for her to start the problem.  Debra seemed not to know how 
to start solving the last two problems on equally likely events.  The conditioning event of 
changing the sample space ofthe original sample did create difficulties for Angela and 
Beth.  Angela was not always able to recognize the change in sample space after an 
outcome was removed, thus had further difficulties comparing outcomes.  Beth 
recognized the change in the sample space, but she had difficulties reassigning 
quantifiable statements after an outcome was removed from the original sample space. 
Verbal responses to their explanations oftheir problem solving processes illustrated the 
lack ofprobability vocabulary knowledge among the five participants.  Angela preferred 
to use terms such as "four to nine chance", "four to ten ratio", and "one to three 
possibilities", using the terms chance and ratios interchangeably, while using the term 
possibility to indicate the odd ofone situation.  Beth appeared the most confused by 113 
terminology, using terms such as "more probability in green" for choosing green overall, 
"four out offive" for stating the odds ofchoosing a Snickers bar, and "He has a one to 
five chance over everyone else ...  while his odds are better than the girls - three boys and 
two girls" to indicate that the chance of  selecting Rick is one fifth, but the boys odds are 
three to two with the girls, not Rick alone.  In Emily's first attempt to solve probability 
problems, she developed her own terminology for explaining her solutions.  Emily stated 
there was "one more ofa chance to get a Snickers bar" after a Hershey bar was removed, 
and her friends probability ofbeing chosen was "one better" after the blue marble was 
removed.  Angela and Debra had difficulties comparing probabilities after a conditioning 
event had occurred, Beth did not seem to understand the difference between probability 
and odds, and Emily was not consistent in her use ofpercentages, ratios, and probability. 
Conclusion 
Among these five participants, rationalization, finding the odds, computing the 
percentages, and stating the ratio ofa problem were the preferred heuristics used to solve 
the problems on the Probability Knowledge Inventory.  Overall, each participant 
encountered difficulties approaching the problems and stating their solutions.  The 
difficulties the students encountered included understanding the problem; recognizing the 
original sample space and when it changes; lacking probability vocabulary knowledge; 
comparing probability after the sample space changed; understanding the difference 
between probability and odds; and interchanging ratio, odds, and percentages ­
sometimes incorrectly - to justify their solutions. 114 
Question Two: After attending a two-week class on sample space, probability of 
an event, and conditional probability, in what ways did the students' heuristics of 
conditional probability change, and in what ways were they able to overcome 
difficulties they had previously encountered when solving conditional probability 
problems? 
Prior to attending the two-week instruction on sample space, probability ofan 
event, and conditional probability, the five participants used a variety ofheuristics to 
solve the problems and encountered some difficulties solving conditional probability 
problems. 
Heuristics 
Prior to instruction, rationalization, finding the odds, computing the percentages, 
and stating the ratio ofa problem were the preferred heuristics used to solve the problems 
on the Probability Knowledge Inventory.  After the two-week instruction, only two 
participants changed their use ofheuristics to solve the problems on the Probability 
Knowledge Inventory.  Beth, who originally relied on probability and odds to justify her 
solutions, changed her numerical justifications to ratios.  However, this change in Beth's 
use ofheuristics may be questionable since the use of  ratios is similar to the concept of 
odds.  Emily made the biggest adjustment in her use of  heuristics.  Previously, without 
prior knowledge ofprobability, Emily rationalized her solutions.  After the instruction, 
Emily used probability to state her written solution, but stated her verbal solution with the 
rationalization of  solving the problem.  Among the other three participants, the two-week 
instruction appeared not to influence their use of  heuristics.  Cathy, the student with the 
strongest probability background, felt that the instruction "clarified the concepts in my 115 
head better".  Cathy continued using probability to justify all her solutions; however, she 
seemed to feel more confident in her solutions.  Angela and Debra continued the use of 
the same heuristics after the instruction.  Despite Angela's claim that the instruction 
clarified her understanding ofprobability, she continued interchanging the use of 
probability and ratios to justify her solutions.  Believing she solved the problems the 
same way prior to instruction, Debra continued using rationalization to solve the 
problems.  However, prior to instruction, if  further clarification was needed, Debra would 
use proportions and percentages.  After the two-week instruction, Debra started using 
probability and ratios to clarify her solutions. 
Difficulties 
The first interview indicated that the five participants encountered difficulties 
solving conditional probability problems prior to the two-week instruction.  However, 
after the instruction, the difficulties in the students' attempts to solve the problems 
diminished.  Angela and Debra, the two students who previously had difficulty 
understanding the question ofinterest, felt more confident in recognizing the purpose of 
the question and were able to give solutions to all the problems.  Angela and Beth 
previously had difficulties recognizing the change ofthe sample space after a 
conditioning event.  After the two-week instruction, when Angela responded to the 
Probability Knowledge Inventory, her solutions indicted that she still had difficulties 
recognizing the change in sample space.  However, during the interview, Angela noticed 
the discrepancy in the sample space and corrected her solutions to the problems.  Beth's 
difficulty with sample space did not improve.  In her second interview, Beth appeared to 116 
have more difficulty recognizing the original sample space, then she had in the first 
interview and she had the same difficulty recognizing the change in sample space in both 
interviews. 
The use ofprobability vocabulary did improve for two ofthe students.  Angela 
consistently reported her written solutions as fractions, and orally, Angela reported her 
probability solutions as "4 out of9" or "lout of5".  When Angela did chose to solve 
some problems using ratios, she continued using consistent terminology with her ratio 
responses, for example: "ratio of3 to 2".  Emily, who previously used her own 
terminology to explain her solutions, changed her terminology to be more consistent with 
probability terminology.  On her Inventory, Emily's written responses would be in the 
form ofa fraction, and she consistently reported the numerical outcomes in probability 
terms: " One out of  5 chances that he will be chosen, 4 out of  5 chances that he will not 
be chosen".  Beth continued having difficulties with the terminology.  She continued to 
confuse ratios and proportions, and her numerical responses were not consistent.  Prior to 
instruction, Angela and Debra had difficulty comparing probabilities after the sample 
space changed.  After the instruction, both recognized that the change in sample space 
also affects the probability.  Finally, Beth continued having difficulties distinguishing 
between probability and odds.  However, after the instruction, Beth first tried to 
rationalize her solutions, then, when she felt comfortable justifying her solutions 
numerically, she used ratios instead ofodds.  As mentioned earlier, this may not indicate 
a change since ratios and odds are similar concepts. 117 
Conclusion 
Overall, the two-week instruction had some influence on improving the 
difficulties that the five participants had solving the conditional probability problems. 
Some improvements included a greater ability to understand the question of  interest, to 
recognize the change in sample space after a conditioning event, to use probability 
terminology consistently, and to compare probability after the sample space changed. 
Question Three: How does each student's understanding ofconditional probability 
compare to the Conditional Probability Framework developed by Tarr and Jones 
(1997)? 
Tarr and Jones (1997) sought to develop a framework to systematically describe 
and predict middle school students' thinking in conditional probability based on previous 
work conducted by Jones, et al. (1997).  Based on their research, Tarr and Jones (1997) 
developed an initial framework, which was then refined and validated though assessing 
middle school students' thinking in conditional probabilistic situations.  A more in-depth 
description ofthe development oftheir framework can be found in Chapter II ofthis 
paper.  The final framework for middle school students' thinking in conditional 
probabilistic situations is shown in Table 3.  The framework identifies four levels 118 
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Table 3: Refined Framework for Assessing Middle School Students' Thinking in 
Conditional Probability and Independence (Tarr & Jones, 1997, p. 48) 
of  probabilistic thinking ranging from subjective judgements to numerical reasoning. 
The description for each level indicates a pattern of  growth in probabilistic thinking.  The 
framework was developed, refined, and validated using middle school students. 119 
However, it may be interesting to observe if  similar patterns are apparent in the growth of 
college level students thinking ofconditional probability.  Thus, the purpose ofthis 
section is to compare each of  the five participants' growth in conditional probability 
thinking against the framework, noting similarities and differences in the findings. 
Based on the solutions on the Probability Knowledge Inventory and the 
interviews prior to instruction, it is apparent that four ofthe participants can be classified 
as Level 3 students, and one participant can be classified as a Level 4 student.  After the 
two-week instruction, despite changes in their use ofheuristics and improvements in their 
difficulties of  solving conditional probability problems, the four participants classified as 
Level 3 did not indicate a strong enough change in their thinking to move up to Level 4. 
Angela and Beth best exemplified Level 3 students.  Level 3 students are aware of 
the role that quantities play in forming conditional probability judgements.  Although 
they did not assign precise numerical probabilities, they often used relative frequencies, 
ratios, or odds to solve conditional probability events.  Level 3 students also try to keep 
track of  the complete composition ofthe sample space and usually recognize that the 
conditional probabilities ofall events change in "without replacement" situations.  Angela 
and Beth exhibited these characteristics in their explanations ofthe solutions. 
Unfortunately, the framework developed by Tarr and Jones (1997) does not 
consider a student rationalizing the solution of  the problem correctly, taking into account 
the change in sample space, without numerical justification.  Debra and Emily, who can 
be best described as Level 3 students, illustrated this particular characteristic not defined 
in the framework.  However, Debra and Emily can not be considered Level 2 students 
according to this framework since Level 2 describes a student who uses subjective 120 
judgements and the representativeness heuristics to solve their problems.  Also, Level 2 
students are prone to assuming that a probability situation containing two outcomes 
assumes that the two outcomes are equally likely.  Debra and Emily did not exhibit these 
Level 2 characteristics.  If  quantifying solutions was not a key characteristic of  Level 3 
students, Debra and Emily could be clearly classified as Level 3. 
Cathy was the only participant who would be considered a Level 4 student.  Cathy 
consistently used numerical reasoning to interpret probability situations.  Cathy was 
aware ofthe composition ofthe sample space, recognized it importance in determining 
conditional probability and was able to assign numerical probabilities spontaneously and 
with explanation.  All these characteristics are defined to be Level 4 students. 
It seemed that the framework developed by Tarr and Jones (1997) can apply to the 
five participants in the study.  However, it is apparent that the characteristics associated 
with Level 3 may need some refining.  It was not evident that the two-week instruction 





Interpretation and Discussion 
As the emphasis for probability in the mathematics curriculum expands, the role 
of  understanding the teaching and learning ofprobability increases.  The intent ofthis 
study was to look at the teaching and learning of  conditional probability in a college level 
mathematics course.  More specifically, this study considered the influence ofteaching 
on college student's use of  heuristics and difficulties they encounter solving conditional 
probability problems in a contemporary college level math course.  By using a case study 
analysis, this study provided an in-depth attempt to understand five participants, by 
providing detailed descriptions oftheir solutions on the Probability Knowledge Inventory 
prior to and after instruction. 
The observed math course curriculum level introduced the concept ofconditional 
probability; hence, it is difficult to compare the results ofthis study with previous 
research on conditional probability.  For example, previous research on students' use of 
heuristics solving conditional probability problems identified two common heuristics: 
time-axis fallacy (Falk, 1983, 1988) and causal bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). 
Chapter II ofthis paper provides definitions and examples ofthese two heuristics.  Due to 
the level of  conditional probability problems on the Probability Knowledge Inventory and 
in the course curriculum, the five participants were not asked about conditional situations 
that took place "back in time".  These types ofconditional probability situations were 
related to the time-axis heuristic.  However, the Falk Phenomenon problem ofthe two 122 
white and two black balls was used in the classroom as an extension question for the 
class.  The Probability Knowledge Inventory was not an instrument designed to measure 
the possibility of  students using the time-axis fallacy heuristic.  Similarly, the students in 
the course were not exposed to questions involving causal relationships.  Hence, the use 
ofthe causal bias heuristic could not be observed on the five participants. 
However, the results ofthis study have some similarities to the difficulties 
encountered in solving conditional probability problems defined in previous research. 
The initial difficulties that the five participants experienced while trying to solve 
conditional probability problems included understanding the problem; recognizing the 
sample space and when it changes; lacking probability vocabulary knowledge; comparing 
probability after the sample space changed; understanding the difference between 
probability and odds; and interchanging the use ofratio, odds, and percentages ­
sometimes incorrectly - to justify their solutions.  Previous research on the difficulties 
students encounter solving conditional probability problems identified three common 
difficulties: difficulties in calculation ofthe inverse ofthe condition, difficulties in 
identification ofthe conditional event, and confusion due to the wording or framing of 
the conditional probability (Falk, 1989).  Due to the level ofconditional probability 
problems on the Probability Knowledge Inventory and in the course curriculum, it may 
be difficult to support or oppose hypotheses ofprevious research on solving conditional 
probability problems. 
Overall, the results from this study may be beneficial to college mathematics 
instructors teaching entry-level probability courses, or courses designed for non­
mathematics and science majors.  Most non-mathematics and science major students 123 
entering college mathematics receive limited instruction on the concept ofprobability, its 
laws, and its applications in real-world situations.  In general, the findings ofthis study 
suggest that these students use a variety of  heuristics and encounter a greater variety of 
difficulties solving conditional probability problems.  Instruction alone may not influence 
their use ofheuristics or help them overcome their difficulties; however, the recognition 
ofthe possible heuristics used and the difficulties they encounter may help the course 
instructor become more effective. 
Limitations ofthe Study 
This study has limitations that could have affected its results.  Some limitations 
include the course curriculum, the role ofthe researcher in the classroom, and the 
research design. 
First, the observed mathematics curriculum was a limitation.  The probability 
curriculum designed for the course did not offer the students an in-depth study ofthe 
concept ofconditional probability.  The curriculum was designed to offer the students a 
general overview ofconditional probability, mainly exploring conditional problems in 
which the removal ofan outcome from a sample space affects the probability of  an event, 
similar to the problems found on the Probability Knowledge Inventory.  The students 
were introduced to the formal definition ofconditional probability; however, the 
problems associated with this definition pertain to the students reading Venn Diagrams 
and tables to gather their data.  An example ofa conditional probability problem using 
the definition ofconditional probability from the course (Parks, et aI., 2000, p. 271): 124 
A study was performed to find out how the number ofdefective 
items produced varied between the day, evening and night shifts. 
Da 
Defective  24 
Not Defective  279 
If  an item is picked at random, find the probability that: 
a. 	 The item is defective given that it came from the night shift 
b. 	 The item is not defective given that it came from the day shift 
c. 	 The evening shift produced the item given that it was not 
defective 
The conditional probability problems the students encountered in the course curriculum 
did not consider the probability ofcause and effect; the use of  Bayes Law; changing the 
sample of  interest; or problems in which the student must "go back in time" to compute 
the probability, as illustrated in the time-axis phenomena.  The limitations ofthe course 
curriculum made it difficult to compare the results ofthis study to previous studies on 
conditional probability. 
The role ofthe researcher in the classroom was a second limitation.  First, the 
instructor was also the researcher for this study; therefore, the researcher was more than 
an active participant observer.  Limitations associated with the instructor as the 
researcher include possible bias the researcher has towards the students, possible changes 
in the curriculum due to the researcher / instructer being aware ofstudents difficulties, 
and the possibility that the students knowing they are participating in a study would act 
differently than ifthey were not participating in a study. 
The use ofthe one group pre-test / post-test design with semi-structured 
interviews creates several implications to the research design ofthis study.  First, the 
exposure to a pre-test may affect the student's performance in the class and on the post­125 
test.  This administration ofa pre-test may sensitize students to respond to the treatment a 
different way than they would if  they had not been pre-tested.  This is referred to as pre­
test sensitization, which is a potential external-validity problem.  A second limitation was 
in the one-group design (Ary, et aI.,  1990).  This was a limitation because there was no 
control group used and the results cannot assume that the change between the pre-test and 
post-test was brought about by the experimental treatment.  This design affects the 
internal validity ofthe study (Ary, et aI., 1990).  By using the same Inventory as the pre­
test and post-test, the student's increased performance may not be caused by instruction, 
but rather by the students recalling during the course instruction how to solve a particular 
problem.  After discussion with the curriculum developer, it was decided that the same 
pre-test and post-test will not have a major effect of  measuring students understanding of 
conditional probability.  Finally, although interviews provide valuable data, just as all 
data, this data could be susceptible to bias. 
Despite taking precautionary measures to ensure the lack of  bias in the final 
analysis, no study is without limitations. 
Implications and Recommendations for Future Studies 
The results ofthis study have implications for mathematics and statistics 
education at all levels, but specifically to undergraduate mathematics and statistics 
education.  Math and statistics educators must help students understand the concept of 
conditional probability, teach them to develop correct heuristics that could be used to find 
the conditional probability, and recognize the difficulties students may encounter solving 
conditional probability problems.  This study highlights possible variables that could be 126 
influential in helping students gain a better understanding of  conditional probability 
problems.  The findings from this study also suggest several areas for further research. 
The two-week instruction the students received in the course could not be labeled 
"innovative", "traditional", or "atypical".  The instruction the students received was the 
method ofinstruction any student would have received ifthey had the opportunity to 
enroll in a class with the same instructor.  The instructor did not change her teaching 
habits, teaching style, or the curriculum expectations for the course.  Previous studies on 
the effects ofclassroom teaching on the learning ofprobability had considered "non­
traditional" teaching methods on its influences the learning ofprobability (Austin, 1974; 
Castro, 1998; Fischbein & Gazit, 1984; Ojemann, et al., 1965a; Ojemann, et al., 1965b; 
Shaughnessy, 1977).  Further research needs to be conducted on the teaching methods 
and their effects on student learning ofprobability. 
The curriculum for the chapter on probability did not contain an in-depth 
understanding ofthe concept ofconditional probability.  As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the conditional probability problems the students encounter in the course 
curriculum do not consider the interpretation ofthe probability ofcause and effect; the 
use ofBayes Law; changing the sample ofinterest; or problems in which the student 
must "go back in time" to compute the probability, as illustrated in the time-axis 
phenomena.  Previous research on the heuristics used by students and the difficulties they 
encountered solving conditional probability problems require an understanding ofthese 
concepts (Falk, 1983, 1988, 1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1980).  Hence, another area for 
further investigation is the use ofheuristics and the difficulties students encounter when 
solving conditional probability problems in a higher level probability course. 127 
A longitudinal study could also more closely examine the long-term effects of 
learning conditional probability heuristics and overcoming difficulties.  Jones, et al. 
(1997, 1999) evaluated the thinking ofthird grade students in relation to an instructional 
program in probability over the course ofone year.  Falk (1986) noted that students and 
professionals educated in the meaning ofsignificant test results tend to misinterpret the 
test results over time.  Probability has become a branch of  mathematics with wide 
ramifications in scientific research, business and industry, politics, and practical daily 
life.  Further investigation may consider how the teaching ofconditional probability can 
influence the understanding ofconditional probability years after the person learned the 
concept. 
As noted in the transcriptions and discussing problems with the five participants, 
it was evident that a hindrance for learning probability was the lack ofknowledge ofthe 
terminology associated with probability and the correct use of  syntax.  As the students 
explained the sample space for Problem 2, it was evident that the students did not know 
the difference between the words "and" or "or".  Angela stated her sample space to be "1 
or 3; 1 or 4; 2 or 3; 2 or 4".  Further indication ofthe lack ofproper knowledge of 
probability terms was mentioned in Chapter IV as a difficulty that many students 
encountered solving the problems.  Angela preferred to use terms such as "four to nine 
chance", "four to ten ratio", and "one to three possibilities", using the terms chance and 
ratios interchangeably, while using the term possibility to indicate the odds ofone 
situation.  Beth appeared the most confused with her terminology, using terms such as 
"more probability in green" for choosing green overall, "four out offive" for stating the 
odds ofchoosing a Snickers bar, and "He has a one to five chance over everyone 128 
else ...  while his odds are better than the girls - three boys and two girls" to indicate that 
the chance of  selecting Rick is one fifth, but the boys odds are three to two with the girls, 
not Rick alone.  Despite the confusion students have learning a new concept, it is just as 
important for them to understand the terminology and syntax associated with the concept. 
Further studies on the teaching and learning ofprobability could also explore the impact 
ofterminology and syntax on the learning ofprobability. 
Finally, during the course ofdata collection for this study, it was difficult to focus 
the interview on the concept ofinterest - conditional probability - without considering 
other background concepts, such as sample space and probability. Future research on the 
teaching and learning ofprobability must look at theoretical probability as a "whole" ­
sample space, probability, comparison probability, and conditional probability. It is very 
difficult to look at one concept without looking at students understanding ofthe 
underlying concepts. 129 
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APPENDIX A: PROBABILITY KNOWLEDGE INVENTORY 
Student Code Number: 
Probability Knowledge Inventory 
1. 	 In a bag, there are 4 green marbles, 3 red marbles, and 2 yellow marbles.  If  you 
close your eyes and draw a marble from the bag, what possible colors could your 
marble be? 
2.  Spin both spinners.  If  you were to sum up the total ofthe numbers selected on the 
two spinners, what are all the possibilities you could you get? 
3. 	 Suppose you had three different colored pencils: red, blue, and green.  Imagine 
you used the red, blue, and green pencils to color each section ofthe following 
figure: 
a.  How many ways can you color in this figure using each color once? 
b.  List them. 134 
4. 	 In a bag, there are 4 Snickers bars, 3 Hershey bars, and 2 Butterfinger bars. 
Suppose you closed your eyes and drew a candy bar. 
a. 	 What kind ofcandy bar do you have the most chance ofdrawing? Why? 
b. 	 Suppose you chose a Hershey bar and ate it.  If  you reached into the bag 
again, what kind ofcandy bar do you have the most chance ofdrawing? 
Why? 
c. 	 Has your chance ofdrawing a Snickers bar in part (b) changed or is it the 
same chance as in part (a)? Why? 
5. 	 Suppose your teacher is going to have a drawing to see who can miss the final 
exam without it affecting their grade.  If  your color is drawn, then you do not have 
to take the final exam.  In a bag, there are 4 blue marbles, 3 green marbles, 2 red 
marbles, and 1 yellow marble. 
a. 	 What color do you want to be? Why? 
h. 	 Suppose you are assigned green and your friend is assigned yellow. Your 
teacher reached in and drew a marble.  Which ofthe four colors do you 
predict will be drawn?  Why? 
c. 	 Your teacher chose a blue marble, and did not replace it.  Suppose your 
teacher has another drawing the following day.  Has your chance of 
winning the second day changed or is it the same as the day before?  Has 
your friend's chance ofwinning changed or is it the same as before?  Why 
or why not? 135 
6. 	 The ASOSU is electing a president and a vice president.  There are five people 
running: Beth, Jose, Maria, Rick, and Joshua.  All five students are considered to 
have an equal chance of  winning.  At the end ofthe day, the results are 
announced. 
a.  Is it more likely the class president will be a boy or girl? Why? 
b. 	 Is it more likely Rick will be chosen for one ofthe positions or Rick will 
not be chosen? Why or why not? 
c. 	 Suppose Beth is selected president.  A vice president is selected randomly 
from the remaining candidates.  Is it more likely the vice president will be 
a boy or girl? Why? 
d. 	 After Beth was selected, has the chance that Rick will be selected for vice 
president changed compared to part (b)? 
7.  You have a die. 
a. 	 If  you rolled the die, can you predict with certainty which number will 
come up? Explain your reasoning. 
b. 	 You rolled the die and got a 2.  Roll the die again.  Does the outcome of 
the first roll affect the possibility of  rolling a 2 the second time? 
c.  Suppose you wanted to roll a 3.  On average, how many rolls should it 
take to ensure that a 3 would come up? 136 
APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORMS 

Probabilistic Thinking in College Students 





By signing this form below, I attest to the following: 
1. 	 I understand that I am a participating in a research study.  The purpose ofthe research 
is to examine college students' probabilistic thinking knowledge.  My participation 
will consist oftaking a pre and post inventory test ofmy probabilistic knowledge. 
2. 	 I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, and that I may withdraw 
my participation at any time with no penalty. 
3. 	 The researcher has explained the purpose and procedures of  this research study, and I 
have been given an opportunity to receive answers to my questions. 
4. 	 I understand that the researcher will keep my responses confidential and will destroy 
all records at the completion ofthe research. 
5. 	 I understand that I will not receive any compensation for my participation in this 
study. 
6. 	 I understand that the results ofthe inventory tests will not have any effect to my 
grade. 
My signature below indicates that I have read and that I understand the procedures 
described above and give my informed and voluntary consent to participate in this study. 
I understand that I will receive a signed copy ofthis consent form. 
Name (printed) 	 date 
Signature 
Questions concerning this research, my rights, or any research related injuries should be 
directed to Mary Bamberger at (541) 758-0897 or bambergm@ucs.orst.edu. 
Questions concerning your rights as a human subject should be directed to the IRB 
Coordinator, OSU Research Office, (541) 737-0670 137 
Probabilistic Thinking in College Students 





By signing this form below, I attest to the following: 
1. 	 I understand that I am a participating in a research study.  The purpose ofthe research 
is to examine college students' probabilistic thinking knowledge.  My participation 
will consist oftaking a pre and post inventory test ofmy probabilistic knowledge, and 
participating in two one-hour taped interviews on my responses to the inventory test. 
2. 	 I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, and that I may withdraw 
my participation at any time with no penalty. 
3. 	 The researcher has explained the purpose and procedures ofthis research study, and I 
have been given an opportunity to receive answers to my questions. 
4. 	 I understand that the researcher will keep my responses confidential and will destroy 
all records at the completion ofthe research. 
5. 	 I understand that I will not receive any compensation for my participation in this 
study. 
6. 	 I understand that the results ofthe inventory test and the taped interviews will not 
have any effect to my grade. 
My signature below indicates that I have read and that I understand the procedures 
described above and give my informed and voluntary consent to participate in this study. 
I understand that I will receive a signed copy ofthis consent form. 
Name (printed) 	 date 
Signature 
Questions concerning this research, my rights, or any research related injuries should be 
directed to Mary Bamberger at (541) 758-0897 or bambergm@ucs.orst.edu. 
Questions concerning your rights as a human subject should be directed to the IRB 
Coordinator, OSU Research Office, (541) 737-0670 l38 
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Research Consent Form 

(At Time of Interview) 

By signing this form below, I attest to the following: 
1. 	 I understand that I am a participating in a research study.  The purpose ofthe research 
is to examine college students' probabilistic thinking knowledge.  My participation 
will consist oftaking part in this taped interview, where I will be asked to explain my 
responses to an inventory test ofmy probabilistic knowledge.  This interview will be 
taped. 
2. 	 I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary, and that I may withdraw 
my participation at any time with no penalty. 
3. 	 The researcher has explained the purpose and procedures ofthis research study, and I 
have been given an opportunity to receive answers to my questions. 
4. 	 I understand that the researcher will keep my responses confidential and will destroy 
all records at the completion ofthe research. 
5. 	 I understand that I will not receive any compensation for my participation in this 
study. 
6. 	 I understand that the results ofthe interview will not have any effect to my grade. 
My signature below indicates that I have read and that I understand the procedures 
described above and give my informed and voluntary consent to participate in this study. 
I understand that I will receive a signed copy ofthis consent form. 
Name (printed) 	 date 
Signature 
Questions concerning this research, my rights, or any research related injuries should be 
directed to Mary Bamberger at (541) 758-0897 or bambergm@ucs.orst.edu. 
Questions concerning your rights as a human subject should be directed to the IRB 
Coordinator, OSU Research Office, (541) 737-0670 139 
APPENDIX C: CLASSROOM EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment #1 
Experiment: 
Roll two 4 sided dice and record the numbers on each die. 
Sample Space: 
Simple Experiment Table 
Outcomes  Frequency  Experimental 
Probability 
Theoretical Probability 
Total:  Total:  Total: 
Event: 
Let E be the event ofgetting an even number ofdots on at least one die. 
Possible Outcomes of Event E: 




Toss a coin three times and record the results in order. 

Sample Space: 
Simple Experiment Table 
Outcomes  Frequency  Experimental 
Probability 
Theoretical Probability 
Total:  Total:  Total: 
Event: 

Let E be the event of  getting a tail on the first coin. 

Possible Outcomes of Event E: 
Theoretical Probability of  Event E: 141 
Experiment #3 
Experiment: 
Roll a IO-sided die (a regular dodecahedron) and record the number rolled!. 
Sample Space: 
Simple Experiment Table 
Outcomes  Frequency  Experimental 
Probability 
Theoretical Probability 
Total:  Total:  Total: 
Event: 
Let E be the event of  getting a number divisible by 3. 
Possible Outcomes of  Event E: 
Theoretical Probability of  Event E: 142 
Experiment #4 
Experiment: 
A bag contains 4 different colored die.  Draw two die from the bag, one after another 





Simple Experiment Table 
Outcomes  Frequency  Experimental 
Probability 
Theoretical Probability 
Total:  Total:  Total: 
Event: 

Let E be the event of  one of  the die is red. 

Possible Outcomes of  Event E: 
Theoretical Probability of Event E: 143 
Experiment #5 
Experiment: 
Spin the spinner twice and record the colors 
ofthe region where it comes to rest. 
Sample Space: 
Simple Experiment Table 
Outcomes  Frequency  Experimental 
Probability 
Theoretical Probability 
Total:  Total:  Total: 
Event: 
Let E be the event that the colors match. 
Possible Outcomes of  Event E: 
Theoretical Probability of  Event E: -------------------------
144 
APPENDIX D: MONTY HALL'S DILEMMA 
Name 
Monty Hall's Dilemma 
The Problem and Preliminary Analysis 
Suppose you're on a game show, and you're given the choice ofthree doors. 
Behind one door is a car, behind the other two doors are goats. You pick a door, say 
number 1, and the host, who knows what's behind the doors, opens another door, say 
number 3, which has a goat. He says to you, "Do you want to pick door number 2?" Is it 
to your advantage to switch your choice ofdoors? 
If  you were the contestant, which ofthe following strategies would you choose, and why? 
d. 	 Strategy 1 (stick): Stick with the original door. 
e. 	 Strategy 2 (flip): Flip a coin, stick if  it shows heads, and switch ifit shows 
tails. 
f. 	 Strategy 3 (switch): Switch to the other door. 145 
APPENDIX E: MONTY HALL'S DILEMMA EXPERIMENT 
Group Name: _____________ 
Monty Hall's Dilemma Experiment 
Data Collection 

Group 1: Strategy 1 - STICK 

It is now your turn to generate data for Monty Hall's Dilemma.  To determine which of 
the three strategies yields the best chance of  winning the prize, we should play each 
strategy many, many times and keep a record of  the outcomes.  Before collecting the 
data, make sure you have a clear understanding ofthe problem.  For a visual 
representation ofthe problem, use the cups as the doors, the matchbox car as the prize, 
and find two objects you would use to represent the goats. 
Understanding the Problem 
Let us suppose that the prize is actually hidden behind door A (i.e. the car is under 
the cup labeled A). 
1. 	 Suppose that you choose door B. 
a. 	 What does Monty do? 
b.  What do you do? 
c.  Do you win or lose? 
2.  Suppose you choose door C. 
a. 	 What does Monty do? 
b.  What do you do? 
c.  Do you win or lose? 
3. 	 Suppose you choose door A.  In this instance, Monty shows you either door B or 
door C. 
a. 	 What do you do? 
b.  Do you win or lose? 
Data Collection 
Use the cups, car, and objects representing the goat to run 100 trials.  Assign each 
person in your group a job: 
1. 	 "Behind the scene" person hides the car and goats under the cups 
2. 	 Monty Hall - asks contestant which curtain he would like.  After the 
contestant picks a curtain, you are to show the contestant the incorrect curtain. 
3. 	 Contestant - chooses which curtain the car may be under. 
4. 	 Data collector - records how many times the contestant "wins" and "loses". 146 
Data Analysis 




Stick-strategy Probability Tree Diagram 











3. 	 After listening to the presentations of  the data collecting techniques and data analysis 





(based on Probability Tree Diagram) 





4. 	 On a separate piece of  paper, use the data collected and analyzed for this study to 
answer the following question.  Can you now justify your answer?  How would you 
explain this choice to your friends? 
If  you were the contestant, which ofthe following strategies would you choose? 
d. 	 Strategy 1 (stick): Stick with the original door. 
e. 	 Strategy 2 (flip): Flip a coin, stick if  it shows heads, and switch if  it shows 
tails. 
f. 	 Strategy 3 (switch): Switch to the other door. 147 
Group Name: _____________ 
Monty Hall's Dilemma Experiment 
Data Collection 

Group 2: Strategy 2- FLIP 

It is now your turn to generate data for Monty Hall's Dilemma.  To determine which of 
the three strategies yields the best chance ofwinning the prize, we should play each 
strategy many, many times and keep a record ofthe outcomes.  Before collecting the 
data, make sure you have a clear understanding ofthe problem.  For a visual 
representation ofthe problem, use the cups as the doors, the matchbox car as the prize, 
and find two objects you would use to represent the goats. 
Understanding the Problem 
Let us suppose that the prize is actually hidden behind door A (i.e. the car is under 
the cup labeled A). 
1.  Suppose that you choose door B. 
a. 	 What does Monty do? 
You flip a coin to decide whether to stick with door B or switch to door A. 
What is your chance of  winning the prize 
2.  Suppose you choose door C. 
a. 	 What does Monty do? 
b.  You flip to decide between A and C.  What is your chance of  winning the 
prize? 
3.  Suppose you choose door A. 
a. 	 What does Monty do? 
b.  You flip to decide between A and the other door.  What is your chance of 
winning the prize? 
Data Collection 
Use the cups, car, and objects representing the goat to run 100 trials.  Assign each 
person in your group a job: 
1. 	 "Behind the scene" person hides the car and goats under the cups 
2. 	 Monty Hall - asks contestant which curtain he would like.  After the 
contestant picks a curtain, you are to show the contestant the incorrect curtain. 
3. 	 Contestant - chooses which curtain the car may be under.  After Monty shows 
you the incorrect curtain, you flip a coin to decide which curtain you would 
like to choose 
4. 	 Data collector - records how many times the contestant "wins" and "loses". 148 
Data Analysis 




Flip-strategy Probability Tree Diagram 











3. 	 After listening to the presentations ofthe data collecting techniques and data analysis 





(bas  ed on Probability Tree Diagram) 





4. 	 On a separate piece ofpaper, use the data collected and analyzed for this study to 
answer the following question.  Can you now justify your answer?  How would you 
explain this choice to your friends? 
If  you were the contestant, which ofthe following strategies would you choose? 
a. 	 Strategy 1 (stick): Stick with the original door. 
b. 	 Strategy 2 (flip): Flip a coin, stick ifit shows heads, and switch ifit shows 
tails. 
c. 	 Strategy 3 (switch): Switch to the other door. 149 
Group Name: _____________ 
Monty Hall's Dilemma Experiment 
Data Collection 

Group 3: Strategy 3 - SWITCH 

It is now your turn to generate data for Monty Hall's Dilemma.  To determine which of 
the three strategies yields the best chance of  winning the prize, we should play each 
strategy many, many times and keep a record ofthe outcomes.  Before collecting the 
data, make sure you have a clear understanding ofthe problem.  For a visual 
representation ofthe problem, use the cups as the doors, the matchbox car as the prize, 
and find two objects you would use to represent the goats. 
Understanding the Problem 
Let us suppose that the prize is actually hidden behind door A (i.e. the car is under 
the cup labeled A). 
1. 	 Suppose that you choose door B. 
a. 	 What does Monty do? 
b.  What do you do? 
c.  Do you win or lose? 
2.  Suppose you choose door C. 
a. 	 What does Monty do? 
b.  What do you do? 
c.  Do you win or lose? 
3. 	 Suppose you choose door A.  In this instance, Monty shows you either door B or 
door C. 
a. 	 What do you do? 
b.  Do you win or lose? 
Data Collection 
Use the cups, car, and objects representing the goat to run 100 trials.  Assign each 
person in your group a job: 
l. 	 "Behind the scene" person hides the car and goats under the cups 
2. 	 Monty Hall - asks contestant which curtain he would like.  After the 
contestant picks a curtain, you are to show the contestant the incorrect curtain. 
3. 	 Contestant - chooses which curtain the car may be under.  After Monty shows 
you which curtain the car is not under, you switch your decision. 
4. 	 Data collector - records how many times the contestant "wins" and "loses". 150 
Data Analysis 




Switch-strategy Probability Tree Diagram 











3. 	 After listening to the presentations ofthe data collecting techniques and data analysis 





(bas  d  e  on Pro  babT Ilty Tree DIagram) 





4. 	 On a separate piece ofpaper, use the data collected and analyzed for this study to 
answer the following question.  Can you now justify your answer?  How would you 
explain this choice to your friends? 
If  you were the contestant, which ofthe following strategies would you choose? 
g. 	 Strategy 1 (stick): Stick with the original door. 
h. 	 Strategy 2 (flip): Flip a coin, stick ifit shows heads, and switch if  it shows 
tails. 
1. 	 Strategy 3 (switch): Switch to the other door. 